Palestine’s Membership at the International Criminal Court: What It Could Mean for Israel

With Resolution A/67/L.28 on the Status of Palestine at the United Nations having been passed with an overwhelming majority at the General Assembly on November 29, 2012, the Palestinian Authority’s status has been upgraded from a United Nations permanent observer entity to that of a non-member observer State. Although the Resolution does not necessarily mean that all States, including the nine that voted against the Resolution and the forty one that abstained, must now recognize Palestine as a State, it does mean that Palestine will have access to United Nations and agencies, including the International Criminal Court.

For many observers, this has been hailed as a great triumph for Palestine, and some commentators anticipate that Palestine will seek membership at the International Criminal Court in order to file claims against Israeli officials for the Gaza blockade, disproportionate attacks against and collective punishment of Palestinians, and the occupation of the West Bank. However, as discussed on my latest contribution to The Desmond Tutu Peace Foundation, seeking membership at the Court will prove to be a double-edged sword for Palestine. For the full article and analysis, visit The Desmond Tutu Peace Foundation by clicking here.

الدولة الفلسطينية وفقاً للقانون الدولي

بقلم جون بلوظية ولينا القاضي

1. مقدمة

إن قرار الجمعية العامة رقم A/67/L.28 الصادر في 29 نوفمبر 2012 فيما يتعلق بوضع فلسطين في الأمم المتحدة قد صدر بناء على تصويت 138 دولة بالموافقة و 9 دول معارضة بينما امتنعت 41 دولة عن التصويت. إن قرار الأمم المتحدة الذي غير حالة دولة فلسطين من دولة مراقب دائم من قبل الأمم المتحدة إلى دولة مراقب غير عضو في الأمم المتحدة؛ يثير عدة تساؤلات في القانون الدولي. أهمها،ما مدى الزامية هذا القرار و مكانته ضمن القانون الدولي؟هل تقوم الدولة نتيجة لهذا القرار؟

2. هل تعتبر قرارات الجمعية العامة ملزمة؟

إن قرارات الجمعية العامة لا تكون بحد ذاتها ملزمة قانونياً على عكس مجلس الأمن. حيث أن قرارات الجمعية العامة تكون ملزمة فقط إذا كانت متعلقة في الميزانية و ذلك فيما يتعلق بالمخصصات و جمع المستحقات. و بناء على ذلك فإن القرار رقم A/67/L.28 له تأثير رمزي دون ان يكون له تأثير حقيقي ومباشر في الوضع الحاصل لفلسطين.

ومع أن قرارات الجمعية العامة غير ملزمة للدول الأعضاء؛ إلا أنها من الممكن ان تسهم في وضع قانون دولي ملزم. حيث إن قرارات الجمعية العامة تكون وسيلة تعبر فيها الدول الأعضاء عن آرائهم حول الأوضاع و التساؤلات الدولية. إن القرارات التي تتلقى تأييداً واسع النطاق فإنها قد تساهم في تشكيل مبدأ او مضمون كعرفاً دولياً،و العرف الدولي يعتبر احد مصادر القانون الدولي. وبالتالي فإنه اذا أصبح هذا المبدأ عرفا دولياً فإنه يصبح ملزماً على الدول الأعضاء ولا يجوز لها اعلان و تكرار رفضها لهذا المبدأ.

إن قرارات و اعلانات المنظمات الدولية بما فيها الأمم المتحدة قد تشكل أراء الفقهاء ("opinio juris") وهو أحد المصادر الخمسة للقانون الدولي. إن الرأي القانوني لا يعتبر بحد ذاته مصدراً للقانون إلا أنه بمثابة "وسيلة فرعية لتحديد قواعد القانون" وذلك وفقاً للمادة 38 من نظام محكمة العدل الدولية.

لذلك، في حين أن القرار رقم A/67/L.28 لا يعتبر قراراً ملزماً إلا أنه قد يسهم في تشكيل مبدأ لقانون دولي ملزم.

لمزيد من المعلومات.

Does Palestine’s UN Statehood Vote have more than Symbolic Value?

The UN General Assembly voted yesterday to recognize Palestine as a non-member observer state with an overwhelming majority of 138 States in favor, nine against and forty one abstentions. The vote has upgraded the Palestinian Authority’s status as a United Nations “permanent observer entity” to that of a “non-member observer state.” The 138 States that voted in favor of Palestinian Statehood eclipsed both the number of States that previously recognized a "State" of Palestine (132) and the simple majority required under article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations to pass the resolution.
One major question remains looming: what impact, if any, will the General Assembly’s vote have?

2. Do General Assembly resolutions have the force of law?
On the one hand, decisions of the General Assembly are not binding on United Nations member States. The General Assembly, unlike the Security Council, only issues binding resolutions in the area of budgetary matters regarding the allotment and collection of dues. Therefore, the General Assembly’s vote will have a largely symbolic effect without any real, immediate impact on the content of international law.
However, while General Assembly resolutions are not per se legally binding, they can contribute to the content of international law. General Assembly resolutions are a means through which States express their opinions about the status of international questions. A resolution that receives widespread support may therefore shape the content of customary international law, a binding source of international law. When a legal principle becomes customary international law, it becomes binding on States to the extent that they do not repeatedly and publicly announce opposition to the principle.
Moreover, the resolutions and declarations of international organizations, including the United Nations, may constitute opinio juris, one of the five sources of international law. While opinio juris is not itself a source of law, it serves as a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law” (article 38 Statute of the International Court of Justice).
Therefore, while General Assembly resolutions are not themselves binding, they may contribute to and shape the content of binding international law.

3. When is Statehood Recognized under International Law?


Principles of International Law (2d ed.)
covers the principal topics of public
international law, including criteria for
Statehood and the recognition of
governments.



A majority vote in favor of Palestine’s state status will not on its own clothe Palestine with Statehood. Rather, Palestine must either meet the elements of Statehood under the declarative theory of State recognition or otherwise achieve widespread and universal acknowledgement as an independent State under the constitutive theory of Statehood.

The declarative theory is the prevailing theory for the recognition of State sovereignty. It holds that an entity is recognized as a State when it satisfies the following objective criteria for Statehood, which were laid down in article 1 of the Montevideo Convention of on the Rights and Duties of States (1933):

- Permanent population;

- Defined territory;

- Effective government; and

- Capacity to enter into relations with other States.

There is a great deal of controversy as to whether Palestine meets these criteria. In addition to the question of Palestine’s “defined territory,” the element that faces the most objection is the question of effective government. Given the rift between Fatah and Hamas, many critics argue that there is no Palestinian government with effective and consolidated control over all of Palestine’s territory.



Yet even if Palestine were not to meet the elements of the declarative theory test, it may qualify for Statehood under the constitutive theory, which holds that an entity is a State if recognized as such by the international community. “Recognition” refers to the formal acknowledgement by other states that an entity is a State. The vote of the General Assembly, while not having per se legal force, will demonstrate the extent to which Palestine Statehood holds the support of the international community and is thus instrumental in determining whether the criteria set forth under the constitutive theory of State recognition has been fulfilled.

4. Will the Recognition of Palestinian Statehood Have any Real Impact?

Many commentators have rightfully pointed out that even if the General Assembly approves Palestine’s application for Statehood, the situation on the ground will remain largely unchanged. For example, Israel, which will not recognize Palestine as an independent State, will continue to occupy the West Bank. Nations that opposed or abstained from Palestine’s Statehood vote will refuse to recognize Palestine as a State, enter into diplomatic relations with Palestine or recognize Palestinian diplomatic missions or consulates.

However, there is one important consequence that the recognition of Palestinian Statehood will have: it will grant Palestine access to international organizations, including the International Criminal Court. This will enable Palestine to initiate claims against Israel at the International Criminal Court. Unlike in the past, where countries could only pursue Israel at the International Criminal Court with Israel’s consent to the Court’s jurisdiction, if Palestine is recognized as a State and becomes a member of the International Criminal Court, the Court would have jurisdiction against Israel as to conduct that occurred on Palestinian territory, even without Israel’s consent. Under article 12.2 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Court has jurisdiction whenever a State on whose territory crimes occurred (Palestine) is a member, even if the defendant State (Israel) is a non-member. Therefore, if Palestine claims that Israel committed crimes against humanity or war crimes on Palestinian territory, the Court would have jurisdiction over the matter.

5. Conclusion

Although the General Assembly vote is in many ways merely symbolic and carries less weight than the binding resolutions passed by the Security Council, the recognition of Palestinian Statehood will have far-reaching consequences that will impact negotiations with Israel as well as Palestine’s access to international organizations such as the International Criminal Court.

War for Peace: The Moral and Legal Case for Intervention in Syria

Archbishop Desmond Tutu stated: “If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor.” Nowhere are these insightful words more applicable than in Syria today. The international community, despite its many summits and conferences, has taken no substantial action to change the balance of power or end the humanitarian crisis in Syria. In its inaction, the international community has adopted a posture of neutrality, thus eroding and undermining the credibility and efficacy of the United Nations, whose chief aim is to secure international peace.

In my article War for Peace, published by the Desmond Tutu Peace Foundation, I make a moral and legal case for intervention in Syria. Click here to read the full article.

منظمة التعاون الاسلامي تعلق عضوية سوريا

بدأت دول الخليج العربية إجلاء مواطنيها من لبنان يوم الخميس في أعقاب حادث خطف مرتبط بالصراع الدائر في سوريا أظهر كيف أن العنف بدأ يمتد في أنحاء المنطقة التي تعاني انقسامات طائفية.

وخطف م...سلحون لبنانيون شيعة أكثر من 20 شخصا في منطقة ببيروت يسيطر عليها حزب الله حليف النظام السوري وقالوا إنهم يحتجزون مواطنين من تركيا والسعودية وهما البلدان الرئيسيان اللذان يدعمان الانتفاضة السورية.

وطلبت السعودية والإمارات العربية المتحدة وقطر والكويت والبحرين من مواطنيها مغادرة البلاد على الفور. وبدأت بعض الدول بالفعل في إعادة مواطنيها لبلدهم.

وحذر حاتم المقداد وهو عضو بارز في عائلة المقداد الشيعية اللبنانية القوية الذي قال انه الجيش السوري الحر خطف اخيه قبل يومين من أن الوضع سيتفاقم.

وعلى الرغم من ان معارضي الرئيس السوري بشار الأسد والقوى الغربية التي تؤيدهم يصرون على أنهم يريدون تجنب العنف الطائفي مثل الذي شهده العراق فإن مقاتلي المعارضة وأغلبهم من السنة خطفوا إيرانيين ولبنانين هناك في الأسابيع القليلة الماضية قائلين إنهم ربما يعملون لصالح الأسد.

وأعلنت عائلة المقداد يوم الأربعاء إنها تحتجز أكثر من 20 شخصا منهم سعودي ورجل أعمال تركي وعدد من السوريين وصفوهم بانهم من مقاتلي الجيش السوري الحر. ومثلت هذه الخطوة ضربة للاقتصاد اللبناني الذي قام فيه سائحون من دول الخليج بدور في تعافيه بعد الحرب الأهلية التي دامت 15 عاما وانتهت عام 1990.

وقال رجل "لم نقم بعد بواحد في المئة.. لم نتحرك حقا بعد" وقال للصحفيين يوم الأربعاء إنه ورفاقه من "الجناح المسلح" لعائلة المقداد مستعدون لاتخاذ المزيد من الخطوات ضد المقاتلين السوريين في لبنان.

وقال ماهر المقداد المتحدث باسم العائلة إن آل مقداد يستهدفون فقط الجيش السوري الحر والأتراك وإن عدد المحتجزين الأتراك "من المرجح ان يرتفع".

[من قناة العربية]

Saudi Arabia Publishes its new Arbitration Law in the Official Gazette

Saudi Arabia has recently published its new Arbitration Law in the Official Gazette. For an overview and analysis, see my recent article at ArbitrationLaw.com.

Syria’s threat to employ chemical weapons gravely violates international covenants

Syria’s threats yesterday to deploy chemical weapons against foreign invaders demonstrates the Syrian regime’s disregard for international law and the customs of civilized nations. The world first came together in 1925 to condemn the use of chemical weapons in adopting the Geneva Gas Protocol. On 29 April 1997, the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force, complementing the Geneva Gas Protocol, but much more aggressively prohibiting the use of all chemical weapons as a method of warfare.

The Chemical Weapons Convention, which applies to both international and internal armed conflicts, has been adopted by nearly all of the civilized world. As of 2012, all but the following six nations have either signed or ratified the Convention: Angola, Egypt, North Korea, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria.

While Syria is not a State party to the Convention, the Convention has become so widely accepted as a standard of the law of war that one can argue that it has become binding as customary international law, comprised of consistent and recurrent state practice developed over time and undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation.

While Syria can argue that through its reservations, it is not bound by the Convention, a stronger argument can be made that the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons rises to the level of jus cogens, or non-derogable peremptory legal norms. Either way, Syria, by threatening to use chemical weapons, shows that it is acting outside the accepted practices of civilized nations.