Until quite modern times, the law was infused with the idea that some principles could not only receive, but also merit, approval or disapproval, and that certain responses could be more just, ordinate, or appropriate than others. This concept is rooted as far back as the ancient Greek philosophers. Aristotle stated that “the aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he ought.” The concept was infused in the philosophical treatises of writers as distinct as Augustine in the West and Avicenna in the East, all who referred back to Aristotle in formulating systemic theological treatises that sought to unveil systems of absolute truth. Like those after them, they discovered through human reason a law universal to all cultures and written on the heart of man. Among the values inherent in this universal law are beneficence, justice, good faith and veracity, mercy and magnanimity. Among the precepts of the universal law are commandments to love one’s neighbor as oneself and injunctions against murder, theft, and bearing of false witness.
These precepts are available to man not only through God’s special revelations given to prophets throughout history, but also through man’s capacity to think and reason. Where men of reason and virtue are permitted to think freely and without restraint or coercion, they inevitably recognize these laws. They also recognize that man is born free, with a natural right to life and liberty.
A. The History of England as an Illustration
The history of England is in this respect illustrative. Men of conscience struggled over a millennium to secure man’s basic inherent rights against kings that historically refused to acknowledge any law higher than themselves. The people’s first victory was the Magna Carta of 1215, establishing citizens’ rights, followed by the Petition of Right by 1628, a defense of the supremacy of the common law over the king, the Glorious Revolution, the English Bill of Rights, and ultimately the abolition of slavery in England. One finds natural law thinking reiterated throughout the great thinkers who shaped and justified these events, from de Bracton to Coke, from Milton to Locke, and even Wilberforce, all who vindicated the idea that the law was above any man, including the king, and that man had certain inherent rights that no ruler could infringe.
B. That the Principles Set Forth in the English Revolution Are Universal to Mankind
1. The United States and France
One cannot understand the American Revolution in general, and the United States Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and Bill of Rights in particular, without understanding the English Revolution. The American Revolution was in many ways the embodiment of the principles set forth in the Glorious Revolution of England. One further cannot understand the French Revolution and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen without understanding the revolutions in England and the United States that preceded it. While each revolution had its own particular context and placed a different degree of weight on the place of faith, tradition, and reason in defining new constitutions and institutions, each one developed a commitment to the fundamental and natural rights of man, such as his rights to liberty, property, expression, association, and assembly.
2. The International Community at Large
a) Instruments of the UN Prove that Rights are Universal
It would be mistaken to state that the rights established by these revolutions are limited to Western nations. Rather, these rights were instituted and embodied in the virtually universally adopted Charter of the United Nations and its related instruments. On June 26, 1945, the international community convened in San Francisco and signed the CUN, the Preamble of which lists as one of the UN’s purposes the affirmation of fundamental human rights and human dignity. The CUN has been adhered to by virtually all states; the few remaining non-member states have acquiesced in the principles established in the CUN.
The fundamental human rights and human dignity laid out in the CUN are further outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 as an elaboration of the human rights provisions of the UN Charter. The UDHR has been nearly universally adopted, passing at the time of its promulgation with 48 votes in favor, zero against, and 8 abstentions. Some sources consider the UDHR to be a nonbinding resolution that set forth a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations” (Preamble UDHR); others view it as an elaboration of the human rights provisions of the UN Charter, and thus claim that it is binding through the Charter.
Regardless of whether the UDHR is binding, a series of more recent international treaties convert the provisions of the UDHR into binding treaty provisions. Among these are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). The majority of states in the international community are parties to the ICCPR, which currently has 167 states party, as well as to the ICESCR, which currently has 160 states party. States parties to the ICCPR undertake to protect the wide range of civil and political rights, including a right to life (art. 6 ICCPR), prohibitions on torture (art. 7 ICCPR) and slavery (art. 8 ICCPR), prohibitions on arbitrary arrest or detention (art. 9.1 ICCPR), a right to trial within a reasonable time of arrest or detainment (art. 9.3 ICCPR) and to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 18 ICCPR), as well as freedom of expression (art. 19 ICCPR). Many of these rights reiterate those vindicated in the English, American, and French revolutions, thus demonstrating that they are not limited to Western nations; rather, as nations across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East have recognized and committed to these rights, they have been proven to be universally applicable.
Although countries in the Middle East have signed on to these Covenants, many scholars maintain that the rights embodied therein are western inventions that are incompatible with Arab or Muslim society. Such scholars point to human rights track records in the Middle East as evidence of this: in most countries in the Middle East, with a few exceptions such as Lebanon, political parties not belonging to the governing elite are banned, freedom of expression is heavily restricted, arbitrary arrests and detentions are the norm, and human rights are categorically violated. Scholars thus argue that the adhesion of Middle Eastern states to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a mere publicity stunt that has no real bearing as to whether the rights contained therein are appropriate or even compatible with Middle Eastern society.
Yet events today in the Middle East prove otherwise. In the Arab Spring that we see spreading across the Middle East, from Morocco to Bahrain, from Yemen to Syria, the peoples of the Middle East have proven that they too wish to enjoy the same basic human rights that have been in place in the West for centuries. They have demonstrated their aspiration to see the implementation of rights and liberties that heretofore were limited to meaningless treaties and other obligations that were signed but ignored by governing authorities. They too have shown that the right to life, liberty, expression, freedom of belief, association, a free press, and a right to choose one’s own government are not limited to the Christian West, but rather, are universal to mankind. They have shown through their blood and sacrifices that man is better and more noble as a martyr than as an imprisoned animal lacking dignity. They have demonstrated the nobility of the human spirit, what it seeks and strives for, and how it yearns with an unquenchable thirst for the freedom that is naturally granted to every human being by his Creator.
Tuesday, May 3, 2011
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
The Principle of Nonintervention within the Context of the Uprisings across the Middle East
A. Introduction
One of the arguments raised by Muammar Gaddafi in the recent Libyan revolt is that the conflict Libya faces is a purely domestic conflict against local and foreign criminals seeking to destabilize Libya. He holds that under the historic principle of nonintervention, foreign nations have no right to intervene in the affairs of Libya. This argument has been reiterated by leaders of other nations in the Middle East. Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen chastised President Barack Obama for intervening in the affairs of Arab nations, where he stated:
Every day we hear a statement from Obama saying 'Egypt you can't do this, Tunisia don't do that. What do you have to do with Egypt? Or with Oman? ... Are you president of the United States, or president of the world? (Mar. 1, 2011, Reuters, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/01/us-yemen-president-idUSTRE7202A420110301).
Does the principle of nonintervention shield Middle Eastern leaders when they resort to violence in quashing domestic unrest and protests? Do the arguments of Gaddafi and other leaders hold sway?
B. The Principle of Nonintervention
As discussed in Malcolm Shaw’s standard reference work International Law, it is a principle of customary international law that states and international organizations may not interfere or intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of other states (see § 5 of Chapter 20). Intervention is “prohibited where it bears upon matters in which each state is permitted to decide freely by virtue of the principle of state sovereignty” (p. 1039). This principle is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (CUN), which states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter” (art. 2.7 CUN).
After World War II, however, this changed. Due to the atrocities committed in the war, the Allied Powers made a firm decision not to allow the German and Japanese authorities responsible for war crimes, including those who committed such crimes against their own citizens, to go free through the application of the principle of nonintervention, since doing so would be a miscarriage of justice. Under this exception to the principle of nonintervention, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East were established to try the war crimes of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, respectively.
Practice thus departed from precedent with the establishment of these military tribunals. Since then, in cases involving the most egregious crimes, international human rights law has ignored the principle of nonintervention. Under current practice, states are obliged under their human rights treaties to respect the rights of both their own citizens as well as aliens within their borders, and other states or international organizations may intervene to assure that these rights are respected if a state fails to insure them. The CUN incorporates this premise when articulating an exception to the general rule of sovereignty: the principle of nonintervention “shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII [of the Charter]” (art. 2.7 CUN).
C. Does the Principle of Non-Intervention Protect Leaders who Violently Quash Civilian Protestors?
It is thus incorrect to argue that leaders may resort to the principle of non-intervention for blanket protection of their actions during even purely civil conflicts. Muammar Gaddafi as well as other leaders in the Middle East should take the prosecutions of civil and military leaders under the International Military Tribunal, as well as its more recent counterparts, such as the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia & Herzegovina, and the International Criminal Court, among others, as warning signs that they too may be held accountable for crimes committed against their own populations.
D. The Duty of the International Community to Act
Not only may nations under international law be permitted to intervene to stop crimes committed against foreign populations by foreign governments, but also, they may under some circumstances be under an affirmative duty to do so.
Furthermore, applicable human rights instruments may require action by member states under their own commitments. For example, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), states parties undertake to protect the wide range of civil and political rights listed in the ICCPR, including a right to life and prohibitions on torture and slavery. The ICCPR requires states not only to agree to not violate these rights, but also to insure the rights by protecting them from other member states’ violations. It thus incorporates an affirmative duty to act.
There are many more examples. We can point to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPG) (1948), which creates an affirmative duty to act. It requires not only that its 140 states parties refrain from the crime of genocide, but also that they “undertake to prevent and to punish” genocide (Art. I CPPG) and further pledge “to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force” of persons charged with genocide (Art. VII CPPG).
E. Conclusion
We may thus conclude not only that there is a deep and inherent fallacy in invoking the largely obsolete principle of non-intervention in cases involving the worst crimes against civilian populations, but also, that there is a duty of third party states under international law to act to stop the commission of such crimes.
One of the arguments raised by Muammar Gaddafi in the recent Libyan revolt is that the conflict Libya faces is a purely domestic conflict against local and foreign criminals seeking to destabilize Libya. He holds that under the historic principle of nonintervention, foreign nations have no right to intervene in the affairs of Libya. This argument has been reiterated by leaders of other nations in the Middle East. Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen chastised President Barack Obama for intervening in the affairs of Arab nations, where he stated:
Every day we hear a statement from Obama saying 'Egypt you can't do this, Tunisia don't do that. What do you have to do with Egypt? Or with Oman? ... Are you president of the United States, or president of the world? (Mar. 1, 2011, Reuters, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/01/us-yemen-president-idUSTRE7202A420110301).
Does the principle of nonintervention shield Middle Eastern leaders when they resort to violence in quashing domestic unrest and protests? Do the arguments of Gaddafi and other leaders hold sway?
B. The Principle of Nonintervention
As discussed in Malcolm Shaw’s standard reference work International Law, it is a principle of customary international law that states and international organizations may not interfere or intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of other states (see § 5 of Chapter 20). Intervention is “prohibited where it bears upon matters in which each state is permitted to decide freely by virtue of the principle of state sovereignty” (p. 1039). This principle is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (CUN), which states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter” (art. 2.7 CUN).
Under this historic principle, state action with respect to purely domestic affairs have traditionally been shielded by immunity in the international arena. This has been the case even when state acts violate the rights of the state’s own people. International law historically would only apply when foreign nationals fall victims to the crimes of a state.
After World War II, however, this changed. Due to the atrocities committed in the war, the Allied Powers made a firm decision not to allow the German and Japanese authorities responsible for war crimes, including those who committed such crimes against their own citizens, to go free through the application of the principle of nonintervention, since doing so would be a miscarriage of justice. Under this exception to the principle of nonintervention, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East were established to try the war crimes of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, respectively.
Practice thus departed from precedent with the establishment of these military tribunals. Since then, in cases involving the most egregious crimes, international human rights law has ignored the principle of nonintervention. Under current practice, states are obliged under their human rights treaties to respect the rights of both their own citizens as well as aliens within their borders, and other states or international organizations may intervene to assure that these rights are respected if a state fails to insure them. The CUN incorporates this premise when articulating an exception to the general rule of sovereignty: the principle of nonintervention “shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII [of the Charter]” (art. 2.7 CUN).
C. Does the Principle of Non-Intervention Protect Leaders who Violently Quash Civilian Protestors?
It is thus incorrect to argue that leaders may resort to the principle of non-intervention for blanket protection of their actions during even purely civil conflicts. Muammar Gaddafi as well as other leaders in the Middle East should take the prosecutions of civil and military leaders under the International Military Tribunal, as well as its more recent counterparts, such as the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia & Herzegovina, and the International Criminal Court, among others, as warning signs that they too may be held accountable for crimes committed against their own populations.
D. The Duty of the International Community to Act
Not only may nations under international law be permitted to intervene to stop crimes committed against foreign populations by foreign governments, but also, they may under some circumstances be under an affirmative duty to do so.
Furthermore, applicable human rights instruments may require action by member states under their own commitments. For example, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), states parties undertake to protect the wide range of civil and political rights listed in the ICCPR, including a right to life and prohibitions on torture and slavery. The ICCPR requires states not only to agree to not violate these rights, but also to insure the rights by protecting them from other member states’ violations. It thus incorporates an affirmative duty to act.
There are many more examples. We can point to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPG) (1948), which creates an affirmative duty to act. It requires not only that its 140 states parties refrain from the crime of genocide, but also that they “undertake to prevent and to punish” genocide (Art. I CPPG) and further pledge “to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force” of persons charged with genocide (Art. VII CPPG).
E. Conclusion
We may thus conclude not only that there is a deep and inherent fallacy in invoking the largely obsolete principle of non-intervention in cases involving the worst crimes against civilian populations, but also, that there is a duty of third party states under international law to act to stop the commission of such crimes.
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
The Libyan Uprising and the Responsibility of the International Community to Uphold International Humanitarian Law
A. Introduction: the Libyan Uprising and International Law
It has been two weeks since the uprising of the people in Libya led to the seizure of several Western Libyan cities by rebels, the defection of various diplomats and military officers from Gaddafi’s regime, and a violent military reaction that has led to over 1,000 mostly civilian casualties. There is talk by the United States, Britain, France, and NATO of enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya to prevent Gaddafi from bombing his own people. What does international humanitarian law say about the present situation in Libya and would a no-fly zone enforced by NATO contravene international law?
International humanitarian law, also known as the Law of war or the Law of armed conflict, is the set of rules regulating the conduct of war and armed hostilities. These rules restrict the means and methods of warfare and seek to limit the effects of armed conflict for humanitarian reasons by protecting civilians who are not or are no longer participating in hostilities. The protection of persons in armed conflicts is governed by the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (Geneva Convention (I) for the Wounded in the Field; Geneva Convention (II) for the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked at Sea; Geneva Convention (III) for the Treatment of Prisoners of War; Geneva Convention (IV) for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War). Permitted weapons and methods of war are governed by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and by their Additional Protocols. With the advent of new forms of weapons, some treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) have more recently been adopted.
B. The Facts
Allegations of the violent use of force by the Gaddafi regime against protestors abound in the press. Amateur videos taken with cell phones of protestors being bombarded and shot by helicopters can be found on Youtube and on Google Videos. Articles written by news services as diverse as Reuters, Agence France Presse, the AP, and Al-Hayat report over 1,000 civilian victims of the fighting. Other news sources report the defection of Libyan Air Force officers who were allegedly ordered to indiscriminately fire at civilians. Human Rights Watch reported nearly one hundred protestors killed by government forces in the first three days of the uprising.
At the same time, some States, such as Venezuela and Cuba, claim that the media reports are fabricated and aimed at undermining Gaddafi in order to facilitate an invasion and takeover of Libyan oil fields.
If the reports by Human Rights Watch and the media are true, then Gaddafi would be guilty of heinous violations of international humanitarian law—more specifically, Geneva Convention (IV) for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Perhaps the most fundamental norm of international humanitarian law today is contained in this Convention: States may not directly target civilians in military attacks.
C. Gaddafi’s Defense
Gaddafi may try to defend himself by claiming that the protests were violent and tipped the country over the brink of civil war, whereby his resorting to the use of force was a necessary countermeasure. Such an argument would be to no avail. International humanitarian law does not cease to apply in civil conflict. Rather, article 3 of Geneva Convention (IV) for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is completely devoted to the protection of civilians in internal conflicts. The article, which is common to all four 1949 Geneva Conventions, states as follows:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; …
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; …
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for …
Because Libya is a State party to the Geneva Conventions, it is bound by these provisions, even in civil conflicts and war. Yet even if Libya had not formally accepted the Geneva Conventions, it would still be bound by them because the Conventions, universally accepted by the international community, have become a source of customary international law.
D. The Responsibility of the International Community
International law requires Libya to protect civilians not taking part in armed conflicts. But international law doesn’t stop there; it also requires the international community to ensure the respect of the Law of war, seek out and try persons alleged to have committed “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions (art. 146 GC IV), and punish those responsible for such breaches. If breaches of the Geneva Conventions are perpetrated against protected persons, all states have an obligation to find the perpetrators and bring them to justice.
The Fourth Convention defines grave breaches as “any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, … wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, … and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly” (art. 147 GC IV). In Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1999), the ICTY held that grave breaches apply not only to international conflicts, but to internal armed conflicts as well.
Nations that have committed to international humanitarian law by signing the Geneva Conventions are required to investigate grave breaches of international law committed by the Gaddafi regime and “search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed [grave breaches of Geneva Convention IV and] bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts” (art. 146 GC IV). The Geneva Conventions thus require not only the respect of international humanitarian law, but also impose the responsibility to ensure the respect of international humanitarian law and to punish those responsible for “grave breaches” thereof.
It has been two weeks since the uprising of the people in Libya led to the seizure of several Western Libyan cities by rebels, the defection of various diplomats and military officers from Gaddafi’s regime, and a violent military reaction that has led to over 1,000 mostly civilian casualties. There is talk by the United States, Britain, France, and NATO of enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya to prevent Gaddafi from bombing his own people. What does international humanitarian law say about the present situation in Libya and would a no-fly zone enforced by NATO contravene international law?
International humanitarian law, also known as the Law of war or the Law of armed conflict, is the set of rules regulating the conduct of war and armed hostilities. These rules restrict the means and methods of warfare and seek to limit the effects of armed conflict for humanitarian reasons by protecting civilians who are not or are no longer participating in hostilities. The protection of persons in armed conflicts is governed by the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (Geneva Convention (I) for the Wounded in the Field; Geneva Convention (II) for the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked at Sea; Geneva Convention (III) for the Treatment of Prisoners of War; Geneva Convention (IV) for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War). Permitted weapons and methods of war are governed by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and by their Additional Protocols. With the advent of new forms of weapons, some treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) have more recently been adopted.
B. The Facts
Allegations of the violent use of force by the Gaddafi regime against protestors abound in the press. Amateur videos taken with cell phones of protestors being bombarded and shot by helicopters can be found on Youtube and on Google Videos. Articles written by news services as diverse as Reuters, Agence France Presse, the AP, and Al-Hayat report over 1,000 civilian victims of the fighting. Other news sources report the defection of Libyan Air Force officers who were allegedly ordered to indiscriminately fire at civilians. Human Rights Watch reported nearly one hundred protestors killed by government forces in the first three days of the uprising.
At the same time, some States, such as Venezuela and Cuba, claim that the media reports are fabricated and aimed at undermining Gaddafi in order to facilitate an invasion and takeover of Libyan oil fields.
If the reports by Human Rights Watch and the media are true, then Gaddafi would be guilty of heinous violations of international humanitarian law—more specifically, Geneva Convention (IV) for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Perhaps the most fundamental norm of international humanitarian law today is contained in this Convention: States may not directly target civilians in military attacks.
C. Gaddafi’s Defense
Gaddafi may try to defend himself by claiming that the protests were violent and tipped the country over the brink of civil war, whereby his resorting to the use of force was a necessary countermeasure. Such an argument would be to no avail. International humanitarian law does not cease to apply in civil conflict. Rather, article 3 of Geneva Convention (IV) for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is completely devoted to the protection of civilians in internal conflicts. The article, which is common to all four 1949 Geneva Conventions, states as follows:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; …
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; …
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for …
Because Libya is a State party to the Geneva Conventions, it is bound by these provisions, even in civil conflicts and war. Yet even if Libya had not formally accepted the Geneva Conventions, it would still be bound by them because the Conventions, universally accepted by the international community, have become a source of customary international law.
D. The Responsibility of the International Community
International law requires Libya to protect civilians not taking part in armed conflicts. But international law doesn’t stop there; it also requires the international community to ensure the respect of the Law of war, seek out and try persons alleged to have committed “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions (art. 146 GC IV), and punish those responsible for such breaches. If breaches of the Geneva Conventions are perpetrated against protected persons, all states have an obligation to find the perpetrators and bring them to justice.
The Fourth Convention defines grave breaches as “any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, … wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, … and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly” (art. 147 GC IV). In Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1999), the ICTY held that grave breaches apply not only to international conflicts, but to internal armed conflicts as well.
Nations that have committed to international humanitarian law by signing the Geneva Conventions are required to investigate grave breaches of international law committed by the Gaddafi regime and “search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed [grave breaches of Geneva Convention IV and] bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts” (art. 146 GC IV). The Geneva Conventions thus require not only the respect of international humanitarian law, but also impose the responsibility to ensure the respect of international humanitarian law and to punish those responsible for “grave breaches” thereof.
Sunday, February 27, 2011
Diplomatic Immunity and the Raymond Davis Case
There has been a great deal of controversy as to whether Raymond Davis would be liable to criminal prosecution in Pakistan for the alleged murder of two Pakistani nationals. The United States holds that diplomatic immunity applies. Former Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi argues that blanket immunity does not apply for the most serious crimes. Still others claim that Davis is a CIA operative and that neither partial nor absolute immunity applies. What is the law on diplomatic immunity and does it apply to Davis in this case?
A. Diplomatic Immunity: an Overview
There are 183 members of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). Both Pakistan and the United States have ratified it. The VCDR grants diplomatic mission staff the privileges and immunities necessary for them to carry out their work. Article 29 provides in part: “The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.” Diplomats thus have complete immunity from criminal prosecution in their receiving states. With some exceptions outlined in article 31(1), they also enjoy immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction in all matters that touch the diplomatic agent’s function as a diplomatic.
The law of the receiving state cannot be applied to the immune person for as long as the immunity lasts and is not waived by the sending state. Because the immunity derives from the sovereignty of the state, diplomats cannot waive immunity on their own behalf.
B. Consular Immunity: an Overview
Because consular officials do not intervene in political matters to the same extent that diplomatic agents do, they are not permitted the same degree of immunity from jurisdiction as diplomats. Their privileges and immunities are governed by the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR).
Article 40 VCCR provides that “The receiving State shall treat consular officers with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom or dignity.” They are not liable to arrest or detention pending trial, “except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial authority” (art. 41 VCCR). If, however, criminal proceedings are instituted against him, the consular officer “must appear before the competent authorities” and the proceedings must be conducted “in a manner which will hamper the exercise of consular functions as little as possible” (art. 41 VCCR). Consular immunity from judicial and administrative jurisdiction applies to consular officials for acts performed in the exercise of consular functions. It does not apply to civil actions arising out of a contract concluded by a consular official in which he did not contract as an agent of the sending State or to civil actions by a third party for damage arising from an accident in the receiving State caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft (art. 43 VCCR).
C. Conclusion
Whether diplomatic immunity applies to Davis depends on his status. If he is in fact an accredited member of the US Mission’s Diplomatic staff in Pakistan, then full criminal diplomatic immunity would apply. If he is a commissioned member of the US Mission’s Consular staff, then criminal diplomatic immunity would apply, except for the most serious crimes. If he is an accredited member of neither the Diplomatic nor Consular staff, then neither form of immunity would apply.
What does all of this mean? First let me set out what diplomatic immunity does not mean. It does not mean that the immune person is exempt from the laws of his own state. If a serious crime was committed by Davis, the sending state (the US) may recall him back to the US to be prosecuted back home. In addition, it may waive his immunity and allow for him to be prosecuted by the receiving state (Pakistan) (art. 32 VCDR).
Let me further clarify what diplomatic immunity does not mean. It does not bar the receiving state (Pakistan) from ever prosecuting a diplomat; it bars prosecution against an individual only as long as he remains a diplomat. Thereafter, the individual may be prosecuted by the receiving state for crimes committed within its territory at the time he served, provided statutes of limitation do not bar prosecution.
In the present case, Pakistan will not be satisfied with prosecuting Davis after his service is due to expire or allowing him to be recalled to the US for prosecution. Perhaps partially due to the sentiments of the Pakistani people, who wish to see their government not caving in to US demands, and partially due to concerns that Davis may not be a diplomat, the Pakistani courts are moving forward in trying Davis in a case that is sure to strain a key US-Pakistani partnership in the war on terror.
A. Diplomatic Immunity: an Overview
There are 183 members of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). Both Pakistan and the United States have ratified it. The VCDR grants diplomatic mission staff the privileges and immunities necessary for them to carry out their work. Article 29 provides in part: “The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.” Diplomats thus have complete immunity from criminal prosecution in their receiving states. With some exceptions outlined in article 31(1), they also enjoy immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction in all matters that touch the diplomatic agent’s function as a diplomatic.
The law of the receiving state cannot be applied to the immune person for as long as the immunity lasts and is not waived by the sending state. Because the immunity derives from the sovereignty of the state, diplomats cannot waive immunity on their own behalf.
B. Consular Immunity: an Overview
Because consular officials do not intervene in political matters to the same extent that diplomatic agents do, they are not permitted the same degree of immunity from jurisdiction as diplomats. Their privileges and immunities are governed by the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR).
Article 40 VCCR provides that “The receiving State shall treat consular officers with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom or dignity.” They are not liable to arrest or detention pending trial, “except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial authority” (art. 41 VCCR). If, however, criminal proceedings are instituted against him, the consular officer “must appear before the competent authorities” and the proceedings must be conducted “in a manner which will hamper the exercise of consular functions as little as possible” (art. 41 VCCR). Consular immunity from judicial and administrative jurisdiction applies to consular officials for acts performed in the exercise of consular functions. It does not apply to civil actions arising out of a contract concluded by a consular official in which he did not contract as an agent of the sending State or to civil actions by a third party for damage arising from an accident in the receiving State caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft (art. 43 VCCR).
C. Conclusion
Whether diplomatic immunity applies to Davis depends on his status. If he is in fact an accredited member of the US Mission’s Diplomatic staff in Pakistan, then full criminal diplomatic immunity would apply. If he is a commissioned member of the US Mission’s Consular staff, then criminal diplomatic immunity would apply, except for the most serious crimes. If he is an accredited member of neither the Diplomatic nor Consular staff, then neither form of immunity would apply.
What does all of this mean? First let me set out what diplomatic immunity does not mean. It does not mean that the immune person is exempt from the laws of his own state. If a serious crime was committed by Davis, the sending state (the US) may recall him back to the US to be prosecuted back home. In addition, it may waive his immunity and allow for him to be prosecuted by the receiving state (Pakistan) (art. 32 VCDR).
Let me further clarify what diplomatic immunity does not mean. It does not bar the receiving state (Pakistan) from ever prosecuting a diplomat; it bars prosecution against an individual only as long as he remains a diplomat. Thereafter, the individual may be prosecuted by the receiving state for crimes committed within its territory at the time he served, provided statutes of limitation do not bar prosecution.
In the present case, Pakistan will not be satisfied with prosecuting Davis after his service is due to expire or allowing him to be recalled to the US for prosecution. Perhaps partially due to the sentiments of the Pakistani people, who wish to see their government not caving in to US demands, and partially due to concerns that Davis may not be a diplomat, the Pakistani courts are moving forward in trying Davis in a case that is sure to strain a key US-Pakistani partnership in the war on terror.
Thursday, December 16, 2010
Reflections of a Sojourner
These are my reflections as I complete my TDY at the Damascus Embassy.
With your glowing nighttime fountains
And awesome towering mountains
With your tiled courtyards and ancient houses
City walls and winding alleys
These are the memories of the sojourner
Damascus
Mother of cities
Damascus
Whose people find providence in all things
Where gifts are given liberally
And glasses constantly refilled
You promote the life of the spirit
You are a great city
You are the product of love
Reflections of a Sojourner
With your glowing nighttime fountains
And awesome towering mountains
With your tiled courtyards and ancient houses
City walls and winding alleys
These are the memories of the sojourner
Damascus
Mother of cities
Damascus
Whose people find providence in all things
Where gifts are given liberally
And glasses constantly refilled
You promote the life of the spirit
You are a great city
You are the product of love
Sunday, November 7, 2010
الحصول على تأشيرات الدخول إلى الولايات المتحدة
في العديد من الطرق التي يمكن الحصول على تأشيرة الولايات المتحدة. الطرق الأكثر انتشاراً هي التأشيرة السياحية والتأشيرة الهجرة. في طرق أخرى أيضا ، مثلاً الحق اللجوء في الولايات المتحدة، الذي سنبحث أدناه.
1. التأشيرات السياحية وتأشيرات الهجرة
معظم الناس الذين يذهبون للولايات المتحدة يذهبون بتأشيرة سياحية أو بتأشيرة هجرة. للذهاب بتأشيرة سياحية، يُجب أن يملأ الاستمارات المطلوبة من قبل السفارة الأميركية ببلد إقامته. ثم السفارة ستدعو طالب التأشيرة للمقابلة. في المقابلة ، إذا كان موظف القنصلية يعتقد أن طالب الفيزا سوف يذهب إلى الولايات المتحدة كسائح وثم سيرجع إلى بلده قبل انتهاء صلاحية التأشيرة الممنوحة له ، سوف يعطيه التأشيرة. لكن إذا الموظف يعتقد أن الطالب سيظل في الولايات المتحدة ولا يعود ، أو أنه سيستخدم التأشيرة السياحية ليهاجر إلى الولايات المتحدة، الموظف سيرفض الطلب.
للهجرة إلى الولايات المتحدة يوجد شروط أخرى. يَجب أن يكون الطالب عنده أحد من عائلته (عادة الزوج، الزوجة، الأب، الأم، الابن أو ابنة) الذي يعيش في الولايات المتحدة وسيتكفل له أن يجئ إلى الولايات المتحدة من أجل لمّ شمل العائلة أو سيكون مدعو من قبل شركة أمريكية من اجل أن يجئ إلى الولايات المتحدة للعمل. يجوز للطالب أن يطلب أيضا على برنامج حظ متنوع فيزا، الذي يختار عددا من الطلاب الذين سجلوا للقدوم إلى الولايات المتحدة. ولكن هذا البرنامج هُو تنافسي جداً: من بين 17 مليون طلب، يتم اختيار تقريباً 50000 فقط. وهذا البرنامج مفتوح فقط للحاصلين على الدبلوم المدرسة الثانوية أو سنتين من الخبرة في العمل.
2. حق اللجوء ومداخل اخرى إلى الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية
الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية تهْتم حول الحرية السياسية والدينية. لهذا السبب ، كل سنة ، يسمح عدة آلاف من اللاجئِين وطالبي اللجوء يجيئون إلى الولايات المتحدة والبقاء هناك. اللجوء للشخص سابقاً في الولايات المتحدة أو دخول الولايات المتحدة ، وعنده مخاوف معقولة من الاضْطِهاد بسبب العرق أو الدين أو العضوية في فئة اجتماعية أو سياسية ، إذا رجع إلى بَلَدِهِ.
إذا كان الطالب خارج الولايات المتحدة ، يقدر أن يسعى إلى أن يكون لاجئا. الخطوة الأولى عموماً للإتصال مع المُفَوَضِيّة العُليا للاجئين في الأمم المتحدة ، التي تفعل التقييم الأول وإذا المُفَوَضِيّة تحدد الشخص كلاجئ، ستوجه الشخص إلى البرنامج المناسب لإعادة توطين اللاجئين.
كل عام الولايات المتحدة تحدد عدد اللاجئين اللذين تقْبَلُهم من كل المناطق بالعالم. وكل عام ، يتغيّر هذا العدد. للعام 2011 ، الولايات المتحدة سَتَقْبل حوالي 75000 لاجئ. حوالي نَصْفُهم سَيَكونون من الشرق الأوسط. وكثير من هذه المجموعة سيكونون لاجئين عراقيين الذين نَزَحوا بسبب النِزاع بالعراق. هؤلاء لاجئين سوف يعودون الى العراق عندما تستقر الأوضاع.
James McClellan’s Liberty, Order, and Justice: An Introduction to the Constitutional Principles of American Government
James McClellan’s seminal book Liberty , Order, and Justice is as important to the history and roots of American constitutional government as Russell Kirk’s Roots of American Order is to American political history. No other book that I am aware of does as well a job in presenting an engaging history of the American constitutional order and of presenting a wealth of information on the constitutions of ancient Greece and Rome , the English natural law and natural rights traditions, and the formation of the American political conscience. The key documents that helped shape what would later become the American political spirit, including the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights, are discussed in prose so engaging that it makes it difficult for the reader to put the book down. This book is an excellent choice for anyone interested in American constitutional history.
The following is a summary overview of McClellan’s treatise:
Introduction
McClellan’s work deals with the principles and characteristics of the American political order by familiarizing readers with the basic principles of the Constitution. Resting on the assumption that “in order to achieve liberty, order, and justice, we must first establish limited constitutional government” (p. xx), the book examines the constitutional foundations of the nation by looking to the English origins of the American Constitution, the first Constitutions of the American States, and the principles that pervade the American Constitution, as well as the interpretation and process for the amendment of the Constitution. Throughout the book, McClellan pays special attention to the separation of powers and the limits placed on the federal government by the Constitution.
Part 1. The Constitution’s Deep Roots
McClellan begins by setting down the four primary characteristics of a good constitution: (i) to “provide for stability and continuity in the governing of a country”; (ii) to “restrain government from assuming powers that rightfully belong to other political entities or to families or individuals”; (iii) to “establish a permanent arrangement that enables public officials and others with political authority to represent the people they govern”; and (iv) to “hold public officials directly accountable to the people” (p. 6-7). McClellan goes on to examine the constitutions of the Greek and Roman civilizations that the American Founders would have studied. Although the American Founders could trace the values of republicanism and political virtue that imbued their young republic, the principles of ancient Greece and Rome cannot fully explain the American experiment. The American Founders found many shortcomings in the ancient constitutions, which did not fully account for man’s nature. The Founders instead turned towards an English heritage to animate their political order.
The American Constitution, which was evolutionary rather than revolutionary, drew many of its precepts from English traditions. America ’s legal order was in many ways a continuation of England ’s common law, which America modified according to its own circumstances. For example, although America inherited the English distinction between cases at common law and cases at equity, the Founders allowed for “the fusion of law and equity in the Supreme Court” (p. 38). In like manner, although America , assigned a role to a representative legislature modeled after the English Parliament in the enactment of laws, it rejected the English principle of legislative supremacy, and instead subjugated the American legislature’s laws to the scrutiny of an independent judicial power.
The new American republic can thus be contrasted with the republic that arose in France after the French Revolution. Whereas the American founders “never thought of repudiating their American past, their British past, or their classical past” (p. 52), the French Revolution, in the eyes of Edmund Burke, “sought a radical break with the past and [attempted] to create a whole new society based on visionary theories of government” (p. 53). The framers of the American Constitution, in contrast, sought to ground their ideas in the political and moral heritage of Hebraic, classical, and British cultures” (p. 52). As for the lawfulness, character of the conduct, quality of the object, and compass of resistance of the American and French Revolutions, the German diplomat Friedrich Gentz observed that “’every parallel’ drawn between the French and American revolutions ‘will serve much more to display the contrast than the resemblance between them’” (p. 57).
Part 2. America ’s First Constitutions and Declarations of Rights
The American colonists adopted the English system of representative government, but introduced a residency requirement for elected representatives and did not have an aristocracy-based upper chamber. Furthermore, the American experiment included an element of local self-government that was stronger than that of Britain and continental Europe .
In 1607, lured by tales of great wealth, English settlers founded Jamestown . In 1620, Pilgrims arrived to Plymouth , Massachusetts , seeking religious liberty, and later being followed by all dissenting Protestants. Agreeing to submit themselves to laws enacted by a self-governing body, the settlers formed the Mayflower Compact, which “marks the introduction into the American colonies of a compact theory of government which would later serve as the basis for both popularly based State constitutions and the United States Constitution” (p. 97).
Because the colonies were viewed by Britain primarily as a commercial enterprise, Britain was not much concerned with political control or the administration of the colonies. The American colonies were thus largely left to self-government. Local government in the form of townships in New England and counties elsewhere played such a significant role in the development of the American political system that de Tocqueville cited them as “a major reason for the successes of the American democracy” (p. 108).
Although the Americans were prosperous under British rule, England’s new tax impositions and restrictions on colonial commerce in 1763 marked an “important turning point in Anglo-American relations” (p. 111). The Americans questioned the constitutional basis of Parliament’s actions and, reflecting on the nature of free government, concluded that their only recourse was in secession (p. 112). In response to the Stamp Act of 1765, the colonies sent delegates to New York to draft a statement of colonial grievances, arguing that “Parliament had exceeded its authority in passing the Stamp Act because the colonies, not being represented in Parliament, could be taxed only by their own assemblies” (p. 113).
A string of events following thereafter ultimately led to the drafting of the Declaration of Independence to justify the separation and enumerate the abuses of the King against the colonies. Prodded by Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, the Americans announced on July 4, 1776 their decision to separate and announced a series of natural rights (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) and constitutional, common law, and charter rights to which the American colonists were entitled.
Although Jefferson, the principle author of the Declaration, did not set out “to find out new principles, or new arguments never before thought of,” but rather, to summarize ideas that had at the time been recognized, McClellan argues that the Western natural law tradition beginning with Aristotle offers a very different conception from the contractual theory embodied by the Declaration. Whereas the former tradition suggests that man’s natural state is one of family and community, the latter tradition resonates a great deal with the Enlightenment thinkers, especially Locke, which suggests that man’s natural state is a state of nature where “all men lived not in family units or villages but … [r]oaming the plains and forests at will, each man … free to come and go as he pleased” (p. 128). In the state of nature of Locke and Hobbes, men came together to form civil society and government only to secure their natural rights. They were free to dissolve government when it failed to protect their natural rights. We can thus conclude that, although the founders believed they were invoking principles from a long-standing Western tradition, the thinkers that were being quoted stood in tension with this tradition. McClellan resolves this tension by arguing that the founders believed that they were invoking the long standing Western natural law tradition, but had confused this by implementing natural rights terminology.
At about the same time as the Declaration Independence, the Articles of Confederation were written. The Articles, which served as a constitution for the united colonies, were agreed upon by Congress on November 15, 1777. Two days later, they were submitted to the State legislatures for ratification, and all of the states ratified them within by 1781. The Articles took effect on March 1, 1781, establishing the “United States of America ” while preserving the “sovereignty, freedom and independence” of each of the individual States (Arts. I-II). The States joined together through the Articles in order to provide for “their common defence, the security of their Liberties, and their mutual and general welfare” (Art. III). The Convention would later give way to the Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 that gave birth to the United States Constitution.
Part 3. The Achievement of the Philadelphia Convention
In the summer of 1787, fifty five delegates charged with the task of revising the Articles of Confederation and putting the government on a “sound financial footing” (p. 243) gathered together in Philadelphia ’s Constitutional Convention. The delegates quickly discovered that in order to “form a more perfect union,” the Articles needed to be completely overhauled and replaced with a new Constitution.
The first proposal for a new political system was the Virginia Plan, which received resistance from opponents of centralization and delegates from the smaller States. Alexander Hamilton in turn proposed a plan that would have given even more power to the central government in order to restrain “the amazing violence and turbulence of the democratic spirit” (p. 260), but his plan received even less support than the Virginia Plan. Many delegates, wishing to reserve most political power to the States, instead supported the New Jersey Plan, which sought to improve the Articles of Confederation rather than write a new constitution. Although the Virginia Plan ultimately won over the New Jersey Plan, the “victorious supporters of the Virginia Plan … saw that if they wished the delegations from all States to sign a new Constitution, they must make important concessions” (p. 263).
The large and the small states ultimately came to an agreement known as the “Connecticut Compromise,” whereby all states would have the same number of representative in the Senate and the number of representatives in Congress would be based on each state’s size. The narrow victory that came out of the Connecticut Compromise is one that has “endured for two hundred years” (p. 264). The Constitution established a strong Chief Executive independent of the Legislature and a Judiciary independent of the Executive.
Regarding slavery, the delegates forbade Congress from interfering with the importation of slaves until 1808, at which point Congress could prohibit the importation (see Art. I, § 9 of the Constitution). Under the “Three-Fifths Compromise,” the delegates also allowed the States to include three-fifths of their slave population in order to establish representation in the House of Representatives: “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons” (Const., Art I, § 2).
Part 4. Basic Constitutional Concepts: Federalism, Separation of Powers, and Rule of Law
a) Federalism
The American system of federalism divides political power between the federal government and the States. Article I of the Constitution enumerates the specific delegated and implied powers of Congress, both exclusive and concurrent, which include the power to collect taxes, to regulate interstate commerce, to establish bankruptcy and citizenship laws, to coin money and punish the counterfeiting thereof, to establish Post Offices, to declare war, to support armies and a Navy, to establish a federal seat for government, and to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” these enumerated powers (Art. I, § 8). Congress was not, however, permitted to prohibit the importation of slaves prior to 1808, to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus, to impose bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, to tax the States’ exports, or to grant titles of nobility (Art. I, § 9). The States were prohibited from entering into treaties, alliances, or confederations, coining money, emitting bills of credit; passing bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, or laws impairing contracts, or granting titles of nobility (Art. I, § 10, cl. 1). Furthermore, the States, without the consent of Congress, were prohibited from laying imposts or duties on imports or exports (except as it may be necessary for the execution of inspection laws) as well as from keeping troops or warships in time of peace or from entering into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in imminent Danger that does not allow for delay.
The Constitution establishes the obligations that the States have to the federal government and to each other as well as the obligations that the federal government has to the States. Among the obligations of the federal government to the States, Article IV requires the federal government to “guarantee a republican form of government to every State, to protect the States against invasion, and, upon request, to protect them against domestic violence” (p. 308). Article IV further prohibits Congress from creating new States from preexisting States, from combinations of States, or from parts of States, unless the legislatures of the States concerned consent.
Among obligations of the States to the federal government, the States must select presidential electors (Art. II, § 1) and “hold elections for Senators and Representatives, and to prescribe the time, places, and manner for such elections” (Art. I, § 4) (p. 309). The States are further obligated to deliver up fugitives charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crimes to the State from which he has fled. They are prohibited in certain circumstances from discriminating against out of State citizens under Article IV.
b) The Separation of Powers
The American system of separation of powers is not a pure separation of powers because the functions of each branch of government overlap. Each branch was permitted to touch upon some of the affairs of other branches. For example, “the President (executive branch) was given a part in the legislative process, through his power of veto and his power to make recommendations in ‘State of the Nation’ addresses to the Congress. On the other hand, the legislative branch, through the Senate, was given some power over the executive branch, in that treaties and presidential appointments to major administrative posts and to the judiciary must be confirmed by the Senate” (p. 331). This overlapping of functions formed a system of checks and balances within the American government.
c) The Rule of Law
The American constitutional system is based on rule of law, sometimes expressed as “a government of laws, not of men” (p. 347). This is a principle that was inherited from medieval England . As Henry de Bracton wrote in the thirteenth century, “The king himself ought not to be under man but under God, and under the Law, because the Law makes the king” (p. 348). Under this principle, no man, government, court, Legislature, or President is above the law.
Part 5. Defending the Constitution: The Struggle over Ratification and the Bill of Rights
After the Constitution was drafted by the delegates of the Constitutional Convention, it became the object of a national heated debate of the States considering its ratification. The two factions that dominated the debate were the Federalists, who supported the Constitution, and the anti-federalists, who supported a federal form of government under the older Articles of Confederation. Led by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, the Federalists launched a campaign to sway popular opinion in favor of the new Constitution. They were ultimately successful when, on June 21, 1788, New Hampshire became the ninth ratifying State, thus establishing the Constitution as the supreme law of the land of the states so ratifying it (Const., Art. VII). Within the next two years, the remaining four states—Virginia , New York , North Carolina , and Rhode Island —ratified the Constitution as well. The Federalists emerged victoriously from the national debate on the Constitution, but they did not do so without important concessions to the Anti-Federalists.
a) The Anti-Federalist Persuasion
The Anti-Federalists opposed the Constitution on a number of grounds, but their chief objection was that it gave too much power to the Federal government. As one Anti-Federalist put it, “some of the powers of the Legislature are ambiguous, and others indefinite and dangerous” (p. 389). Another wrote that the new system was “a consolidation of all the States into one larger mass, however diverse the parts may be of which it is composed. The idea of an uncompounded republic … containing six million white inhabitants all reduced to the same standard of morals or habits, and of laws, is in itself an absurdity and contrary to the whole experience of mankind” (p. 386). The Anti-Federalists further argued that the Constitution established a small aristocracy that would bind the nation with their decisions made in “some distant, yet-to-be-built city far removed from the watchful eye of the people they represented” (p. 387). The system was “an invitation to despotism” (p. 387).
b) The Federalist Response
The Federalists, in response, argued that the federal government under the new Constitution was limited to a series of enumerated powers that provided the nation with only the “bare essentials of government” (p. 393). Even the power “to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare” was not an “unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare,” but was rather a license to the federal government to tax and spend only “to carry out one of its enumerated powers” (p. 398).
The Federalists contrasted the President under the new Constitution from the English monarch: “the President was elected by the people for four years, whereas the King is a perpetual hereditary prince; the President can be impeached and removed from office, whereas the person of the King is ‘sacred and inviolable’; the President has a qualified veto, whereas that of the King is absolute” (p. 400). As for the judiciary, Hamilton said that it was “beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power” (p. 401).
The Federalists further argued that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary in a federal government of limited enumerated powers that in no way denied the rights or powers retained by the States or the people. In a democratic nation, Hamilton argued that a Bill of Rights had “no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people,” as in the case of America, because “in strictness, the people surrender nothing, and as they retain everything, they have no need of particular reservations” (p. 402).
c) The Bill Of Rights
The Anti-Federalists nonetheless remained fearful of an overpowering federal government, and insisted that civil liberties be guaranteed in the Constitution. A Bill of Rights enumerating basic freedoms of all American citizens was thus added to the Constitution in 1791. Yet as the Ninth Amendment attests, the freedoms protected from federal infringement are not limited to those enumerated in the Bill of Rights: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people” (Const., Ninth Amd.). Although many have argued that the Bill of Rights is superfluous, many others have felt that it served as an important guarantee against a powerful federal government that would inevitably transgress its limited enumerated powers.
Part 6. Interpreting and Preserving the Constitution
At the American founding, because written constitutions were unprecedented, there was no body of legal literature on constitutional interpretation. Members of the American federal judiciary thus created their own rules of interpretation, based on principles used for the interpretation of statutes or treatises that were derived in ancient law, Roman law, and English law. McClellan writes that the basic task of the courts when interpreting laws, treatises, or constitutions is to determine the legislature intent. “[W]hen the words are dubious and the alternative means of construction have failed to uncover the intent of the lawmakers,” Blackstone wrote, judges must employ “reason and spirit of the law” to derive the underlying intent (p. 467). This role of the judiciary in interpreting the law, and not in making the law, was well articulated by Sir Francis Bacon, who warned the judges of England “to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus dare—to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law” (p. 475).
The American Constitution departed from the English tradition of legislative supremacy whereby Parliament serves as the ultimate arbiter as to whether its acts are constitutional. The American Constitution, in contrast, through the Supremacy Clause, establishes a hierarchy of laws with the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, “followed by Federal laws and treaties, descending finally to State constitutions, State laws, and local ordinances” (p. 477).
The Supreme Court established early on the principle of judicial review. In the controversial case Marbury v. Madison (1803) (Marshall, C.J.), John Marshall, while Secretary of State, failed to deliver to the plaintiff Marbury his commission to become a justice of the peace in D.C. At the time, Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, which allowed parties to go to the Supreme Court to demand writs of mandamus that order a government official to fulfill his duty. Marbury went to the Supreme Court to demand the writ, and the Court was called upon to determine whether the Judiciary Act of 1789 was validly in keeping with the Constitution.
Marbury begins his line of reasoning, stating that “The question, whether an act repugnant to the Constitution, can become the law of the land … is a question deeply interesting to the United States ” (p. 481). He goes on to conclude that the Act impermissibly expanded the original jurisdiction of the Court, which was constitutionally limited to cases involving ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and States. Marshall therefore refused to grant the writ to Marbury and argued that the Supreme Court must go to the Constitution on its own when interpreting it, and not rely on interpretations of other branches of government.
In our modern day, Marbury has come to be interpreted as stating that the Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on what the Constitution says. Yet nothing in Marbury suggests that the Judicial Branch can do any better a job than any of the other branches in interpreting the Constitution. Some have argued that each branch of government is obligated to read and abide by the Constitution. For example, if the President reads the Constitution and concludes that it means something different than what the Supreme Court says, he is obliged to follow his own thinking. The Supreme Court has disagreed, holding that the President and state courts and governors are obliged to follow the Court’s interpretations of the Constitution over their own. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816), for example, the Virginia Supreme Court refused to comply with a U.S. Supreme Court order to enter a judgment pursuant to the federal Judiciary Act of 1789, which subjected state court decisions regarding the validity of federal laws to the judicial review of the United States Supreme Court. The Virginia Supreme Court, although it agreed that state judges were required under Article VI to obey the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States , it believed that state judges were not bound to obey the Supreme Court’s interpretations of them. The Virginia Supreme Court argued that such a requirement would infringe on state sovereignty. Justice Story, writing the majority opinion, sharply disagreed, writing that the Constitution is “crowded with provisions which restrain or annul the sovereignty of the States” and that “the doctrine of absolute State sovereignty insisted upon by the Virginia judges ran counter to the whole theory of Federal supremacy” (p. 483). He held that Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of constitutional questions under article III. With Marburgy and Hunter’s Lessee as its precedents, the Supreme Court may today strike down any federal, state, or local law that it finds to be unconstitutional.
The States and the people do, however, retain some control over the interpretations of the Constitution laid out by the Supreme Court. They may enact amendments that curb what the Court may decide on certain matters or they may altogether remove the Court’s power to hear certain questions by curbing the Court’s jurisdiction.
Part 7. Changing the Constitution
In Part 7, McClellan gives an overview of the process for amending the Constitution and of the American Bill of Rights, as well as explanations of the Amendments added since 1791, their history, and how they came into being. The Amendment process, notes McClellan, is the most formal of the various ways in which our “living” Constitution may be changed. But the Constitution may also be changed “as a result of custom, practice, and judicial decisions” (p. 551), but “[m]ost changes of this nature are supplementary rather than revisionary, and may be seen as additions to, or refinements of, a particular provision of the Constitution” (p. 552). For example, the advent of motion pictures, radio, and television, changed the scope of the First Amendment without changing the principle instituted therein.
The framers understood that “A constitution cannot long endure if it may be amended too easily or too swiftly” (p. 560). The process of amending the Constitution therefore “prefers evolutionary to revolutionary change” (p. 561) by requiring extraordinary majorities. The framers also understood that in order to protect the sovereignty of the States, they should play a commanding role in the amendment process. Even if Congress chooses not to propose an amendment, the States may “initiate an amendment of their own by the convention method, ratify it on their own authority, and circumvent the Congress” (p. p. 562). Despite the efforts of the framers to protect States’ rights, they could not foresee the Supreme Court’s doctrine of “incorporation,” which would apply to the States the restrictions established in the Bill of Rights, which were originally intended to apply to the federal government (p. 573). This doctrine came through the Fourteenth Amendment, which established that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
The various Amendments demonstrate the great extent to which the people, through their States, have been active in effecting change in the American Republic . Perhaps the most interesting story offered in the description of the Amendments is the explanation of the Twenty Second Amendment, which establishes that “No law varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.” McClellan writes that the amendment came to be passed “largely because of the diligence and perseverance of a young college student” (p. 592). Gregory D. Watson, an undergraduate economics major at the University of Texas at Austin, stumbled upon the Congressional Pay Amendment and decided to write a research paper on it where he argued that “a proposed amendment remains valid for ratification indefinitely, unless Congress has placed a time limit upon it” (p. 592). Although Watson’s college instructor was unpersuaded, Watson, after leaving the University, “waged a lonely ten-year battle to generate support for the Amendment. Truly a one-man lobbying firm, Watson encouraged State legislators throughout the Union to support the Amendment. One by one, first Maine in 1983, then Colorado in 1984, the States rallied to the cause.” Ten years later, Watson triumphed when the Archivist of the United States certified in 1992 that the Pay Amendment “had been duly ratified by three-fourths of the States” (p. 592). This was the story of one individual’s “prophetic vision, indomitable spirit, and hard labor” (p. 592). It shows that America truly is a nation of the people; even one person, with no apparent political power or office, may make a difference.
Conclusion
McClellan concludes the volume by highlighting the many advantages of the Constitution, including the power of a Federal Union held together by the Constitution, which has given rise to an internal American free-trade area that has “produced remarkable and enduring material prosperity” (p.594). However, he warns that political order and liberty in America may not endure if the moral order disintegrates or if political participation on the part of citizens ceases. Yet if enough Americans are willing to work hard at it, “there is good reason to expect that the American Republic will endure for many more centuries” (p. 600).
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)



