Following is a letter that I had sent to every United States Senator last week, advocating military intervention in Syria. This week, I had it sent to members of President Obama's administration. I ask every reader who agrees with my message to send this letter to your elected representatives. The time is now for our nation to assume its position of leadership and undertake to end the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria.
June 29, 2012
Honorable Senator
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Mr. Senator:
Over the past sixteen months, the people of Syria have risen up against a regime that for over four decades has denied its people basic rights and freedoms. In response to demonstrations and protests, the regime of President Bashar al-Assad has reacted with overwhelming force to crush an opposition movement, giving way to nearly sixteen thousand victims to date.
According to the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria, Syrian state agents have violated various provisions of international humanitarian law, failed to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and failed to exercise proportionality with respect to civilian losses. International agencies such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent were, for too long, denied access to attend to the victims of the violence. Doctors without Borders states that the Syrian government continues to deny basic medical care to injured civilians.
The international community has given the Assad regime time, but in this time, Assad has only hardened his attitude. Reports have emerged from Reuters and the AFP of systematic acts of violence against civilians at the hands of the Assad regime. The United Nations-appointed Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic has reported that the government of Syria is responsible for “crimes against humanity of murder, torture, rape or other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances of persons and other inhumane acts of a similar character.”
It has now become evident that diplomacy and negotiation have failed. Given Assad’s unwillingness to relinquish power, regime change through a military intervention is the only way forward. The United States cannot wait for Russia’s consent to collective security action under the United Nations Charter. Given Russia’s objection to the use of force, the international community, led by the United States, must act on its moral responsibility to protect Syrians.
This moral responsibility is rooted in international law. Under the responsibility to protect doctrine, the international community has a duty to intervene when a people suffers from egregious acts of violence at the hands of their State. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights further requires States to ensure the protection of the right to life, prohibitions on torture, and freedom of thought and expression, all of which have been violated by the Syrian regime. Whether through a community of like-minded States or through the United Nations, the United States must assume its position of leadership in defending these rights.
That the United States has passively deferred to Russia on Syria is concerning on several fronts. First, Russia’s objections to an intervention neglect a responsibility to defend international security and peace, one that Russia, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, has a special duty to uphold. Second, Russia’s insistence on non-intervention is hypocritical in light of Russia’s Syria-bound shipments of attack helicopters, anti-aircraft weapons, and warships. With regiments of Russian marines and heavy weaponry being carried on such ships and Russia’s economic interest in supplying arms to Syria, the pretext of protecting Russian citizens in Syria is hardly convincing. Because Russia’s interest in armaments sales to the Syrian regime conflicts with its interest in resolving the Syrian conflict, Russian leadership on Syria lacks credibility.
In 1999, the world stood at the crossroads of a similar humanitarian intervention. Permanent members of the United Nations Security Council locked horns on the crisis in Kosovo. Despite a Russian veto, NATO undertook military action, and most observers now agree that NATO’s actions were legitimate and justified under international law.
When the events of the Syrian liberation are recounted in history, the countries that stood in silence with Russia will be judged with blood on their hands. The nations that acted to defend the Syrian people will be vindicated. Will America sit in silence as Russia protects Assad’s slaughter of the Syrian people, or will it hasten the fall of the Assad regime?
The time is now for military action to accelerate regime change. The United States, together with a coalition of allies including Great Britain, France, and Turkey, must make a clear ultimatum to Assad: he may step down now in exchange for immunity, or otherwise face consequences in the form of military action, including air strikes to neutralize Syrian intelligence and strategic bases; the establishment of a no-fly zone; safe havens in Syria and at the Turkish border; material support to the opposition in the form of armaments and other military equipment; and a media war against the Syrian regime with an aim to induce mass defections.
Given concerns prevailing as to the landscape of post-Assad Syria, Washington can condition its military support to the opposition on commitments by the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian National Council to guarantee the rights of minorities and establish a power-sharing model under the new Constitution, where Sunni Muslims as well as Alawi and Christian minorities share power and guarantee the respect for the rule of law.
With the support of a coalition of liked-minded nations, American action in Syria need not be unilateral. Yet the international community will not act until the United States assumes its position of world leadership.
Sincerely,
John M. B. Balouziyeh, Esq.
Friday, July 6, 2012
Wednesday, June 27, 2012
الخصوصية واعتراض البيانات المعلوماتية في المملكة العربية السعودية
إن أنظمة المملكة العربية السعودية المتعلقة بالبيانات المعلوماتية مبنية على النظام الأساسي للحكم في المملكة العربية السعودية، حيث نجد أن النظام الأساسي للحكم يتطرق إلى موضوع الخصوصية كحق يتمحور حول كرامة الإنسان. فهو يصون، على سبيل المثال، المراسلات البرقية والبريدية والمخابرات الهاتفية وغيرها من وسائل الاتصال، ويحظر، فيما يحظره من أشياء، الإطلاع عليها أو الاستماع إليها إلا في الحالات التي يبينها النظام. [المادة 40 من النظام الأساسي للحكم].
وفي هذا الإطار، وانطلاقاً من مبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية التي رسخت قاعدة المسئولية التقصيرية عن الأضرار الناشئة عن الإفصاح غير القانوني عن المعلومات الشخصية الخاصة بالأفراد، فقد ركز المشرع السعودي على انتهاكات الخصوصية المتعلقة بالاتصالات وتقنية المعلومات.
فعلى سبيل المثال، نجد أن نظام الاتصالات الصادر بقرار مجلس الوزراء رقم 74 وتاريخ 5/3/1422 يحظر على مزودي خدمات الانترنت وشركات الاتصالات التقاط أي مكالمات هاتفية أو معلومات منقولة خلال شبكات الاتصالات العامة [الفقرة 7 من المادة 37]، أو تعمد الكشف – خارج نطاق الواجب – عن أي معلومات أو محتويات أي رسالة تم اعتراضها خلال إرسالها [الفقرة 13 من المادة 37]. ومن ناحية ثانية، نجد أن النظام يفرض عقوبات قد تصل إلى 5 مليون ريال سعودي (أي ما يعادل 1,3 مليون دولار أمريكي).
وفي السياق نفسه، نجد أيضا أن نظام مكافحة جرائم المعلوماتية الصادر بالمرسوم الملكي الكريم رقم م/17 وتاريخ 7/3/1428 هـ [الموافق 26/3/2007 م] يفرض عقوبات مدنية وجنائية مشددة على انتهاك سرية البيانات الشخصية وبما يشتمل على اعتراض البيانات المرسلة عن طريق الشبكة المعلوماتية دون مسوغ نظامي، أو الدخول غير المشروع إلى البيانات أو الكمبيوترات البنكية بغرض تعديل البيانات الشخصية أو مسحها أو إتلافها أو إعادة توزيعها. وقد تصل هذه العقوبات إلى 3,000,000 ريال سعودي مع السجن لمدة أربع سنوات. [المواد 3 إلى 5].
إن أنظمة حماية البيانات المعلوماتية في المملكة العربية السعودية هي أنظمة جديدة نسبيا، وهي آخذة بالنمو والتطور. وإن هذه الأنظمة تعبر عن الاعتراف العالمي المتنامي بأهمية ضبط البيانات المعلوماتية الخاصة في هذا العصر الرقمي، الأمر الذي يجب أن تدركه جميع المؤسسات المالكة لهذه البيانات.
Saturday, February 25, 2012
Examining China and Russia’s Claims on Intervention in Syria in Light of International Law
After vetoing a UN resolution aimed at stopping the bloodshed in Syria , China and Russia have refused to attend the Friends of Syria meeting in Tunis or take sides in Syria
China and Russia
a) Collective security measures
Chapter VII of the UN Charter permits two exceptions to the principle of non-interference; the use of force is permitted when acting pursuant to: (i) UN collective security measures (arts. 42 CUN); and (ii) self-defense (art. 51 CUN). As discussed below, the first exception applies toSyria
b) The mandate to intervene in internal armed conflicts under theGeneva
Taking into account the experience of the Second World War, where civilians were systematically targeted in both internal as well as international conflicts, the international community in 1949 revised the three Geneva Conventions and adopted a fourth Geneva Convention to provide for the protection of civilians from the consequences of war. The results were the four 1949 Geneva Conventions that today deal with the treatment and protection of persons—both combatants and civilians—during armed conflict.
Several international legal instruments create an affirmative duty to act when life and basic fundamental freedoms are threatened. For example, the Genocide Convention requires not only that its 140 states parties refrain from the crime of genocide, but also that they “undertake to prevent and to punish” genocide (Art. I CPPG) and further pledge “to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force” of persons charged with genocide (Art. VII CPPG). The International Court of Justice thus found in the Bosnian Genocide Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (2007) that Belgrade breached international law not by committing genocide, but by failing to prevent it.
b) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
States parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) (ICCPR) undertake to protect the wide range of civil and political rights, including a right to life (art. 6 ICCPR), prohibitions on torture (art. 7 ICCPR) and arbitrary arrest or detention (art. 9.1 ICCPR), a right to trial within a reasonable time of arrest or detainment (art. 9.3 ICCPR) and to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 18 ICCPR), as well as freedom of expression (art. 19 ICCPR).
Russia China Vienna China ’s signing the treaty and the ratification thereof, it may not undertake any actions that defeat the object and purpose of the treaty (see art. 18 Vienna
Russia and China
1. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states
2. The principle of non-interference is not absolute
In light of the CUN’s provisions on collective security measures, international humanitarian law, and the affirmative duty to act created under various international conventions, the principle of non-interference is not absolute and must be weighed against the duty of states to protect life and uphold fundamental liberties.a) Collective security measures
Chapter VII of the UN Charter permits two exceptions to the principle of non-interference; the use of force is permitted when acting pursuant to: (i) UN collective security measures (arts. 42 CUN); and (ii) self-defense (art. 51 CUN). As discussed below, the first exception applies to
The Security Council may employ the use of force in order to secure peace. If the Security Council determines the existence of any threat to or breach of the peace or act of aggression, it is to make recommendations or decide what measures are to be taken to maintain or restore peace (art. 39 CUN). In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force (e.g., sanctions, the severance of diplomatic relations, etc.) are to be employed (art. 41 CUN). However, if these measures are inadequate or ineffective, the SC may take military action “by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” (art. 42 CUN). This represents the first important exception to the principle of non-interference.
b) The mandate to intervene in internal armed conflicts under the
Taking into account the experience of the Second World War, where civilians were systematically targeted in both internal as well as international conflicts, the international community in 1949 revised the three Geneva Conventions and adopted a fourth Geneva Convention to provide for the protection of civilians from the consequences of war. The results were the four 1949 Geneva Conventions that today deal with the treatment and protection of persons—both combatants and civilians—during armed conflict.
The Geneva Conventions also codify the rules of engagement in non-international (internal) armed conflict. Common article 3 (common to the four Geneva Conventions) is the first express codification of law for non-international armed conflicts, such as civil wars and civil insurrections. Common article 3 establishes fundamental rules from which no derogation is permitted and whose violation gives rise to individual rather than state liability. It contains the essential rules of the Geneva Conventions as applied to conflicts of a domestic (internal) character and applies to all non-combatants, including soldiers who have “laid down their arms” (surrendered) or those placed hors de combat due to injury or sickness.
Common article 3 requires that the wounded and the sick be collected and cared for and grants the International Committee of the Red Cross and other impartial humanitarian bodies the right to offer their services to the parties to the conflict. It calls on the parties to the conflict to endeavor to bring all or parts of the Geneva Conventions into force through special agreements and recognizes that the application of these rules does not affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict (art. 3(2) GC III).
Evidence of Syria’s violation of the provisions of common article 3, including but not limited to its failure to allow humanitarian aid reach the wounded and the sick and government shelling of civilian objects and neighborhoods, puts the UN Security Council in a position in which it may take measures to restore peace and enforce international law, including ordering the use of force through taking military action “as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace” (art. 42 CUN).
3. The affirmative duty to act under international law
a) OverviewSeveral international legal instruments create an affirmative duty to act when life and basic fundamental freedoms are threatened. For example, the Genocide Convention requires not only that its 140 states parties refrain from the crime of genocide, but also that they “undertake to prevent and to punish” genocide (Art. I CPPG) and further pledge “to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force” of persons charged with genocide (Art. VII CPPG). The International Court of Justice thus found in the Bosnian Genocide Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (2007) that Belgrade breached international law not by committing genocide, but by failing to prevent it.
While the Genocide Convention may not apply to Syria
b) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
States parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) (ICCPR) undertake to protect the wide range of civil and political rights, including a right to life (art. 6 ICCPR), prohibitions on torture (art. 7 ICCPR) and arbitrary arrest or detention (art. 9.1 ICCPR), a right to trial within a reasonable time of arrest or detainment (art. 9.3 ICCPR) and to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 18 ICCPR), as well as freedom of expression (art. 19 ICCPR).
If reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN, the Arab League and European countries and the US are true, then Syria
4. Conclusion
If reports of violence against civilians at the hands of the Syrian regime are supported by sufficient evidence, it would be unfitting forThursday, September 29, 2011
Landmark Congo Decision May Hinder Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Hong Kong Against Sovereign States
It was recently reported that the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal handed down a controversial judgment holding that the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) enjoyed an absolute right of immunity, despite what appeared to be an express waiver of immunity in the agreements signed by the DRC (click here for the full story).
SNR Denton reports the following background information: “Post 1997, Hong Kong has been in something of a quandary with regard to the issue of sovereign state immunity. On the one hand, the pre-1997 Common Law in Hong Kong acknowledged the doctrine of restrictive state immunity, that is, that a state could be sued when it has engaged in purely commercial transactions. On the other hand, the position in the People's Republic of China [PRC] has been consistent and unequivocal: Sovereign states enjoy absolute immunity from domestic courts of another sovereign state, the only exception being where the defendant state waives immunity before the forum state.”
On August 26, 2011, this dilemma came to the fore in the case Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates, which involves an attempt by US-based investment fund FG Hemisphere Associates to enforce arbitral awards against Hong Kong-based assets of the DRC. In June, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, in a controversial judgment overturning the Court of Appeal, came to the view that the DRC enjoyed an absolute right of immunity, notwithstanding what appeared to be an express waiver of immunity in the agreements signed by the DRC. The Court then referred the matter to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, which affirmed the Court’s conclusion: the DRC enjoys absolute immunity from the domestic courts of Hong Kong, the only exception being where the DRC waives immunity.
The challenges that this decision poses to investors applies not only when dealing with states holding assets in Hong Kong, but also when assets are being held anywhere in mainland China. Because the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress affirmed the CFA’s ruling, it would presumably similarly instruct courts located anywhere on mainland China to dismiss suits brought against sovereign states for the enforcement of arbitral awards when such states protest the jurisdiction of the courts of the PRC, regardless of what agreements the states have signed.
This is negative news for companies doing business with states (or state agencies). It likely means states could protect all of their funds and other assets in Hong Kong and mainland China and then sign whatever waivers as to sovereign immunity they wish, but when it comes to enforcing judgments awarded against them, simply not pay out refuse the jurisdiction of the courts of mainland China and Hong Kong at the hour of enforcement. The courts of China and Hong Kong will then dismiss the matters, given their policy of absolute sovereign immunity. Investors should be aware that, if a state does not pay out its judgment willingly, going to Hong Kong or mainland China for enforcement will bear little fruit.
The DRC is not a state party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which requires courts of contracting states to recognize and enforce arbitral awards made in other contracting states. Yet even if it were, it appears that the outcome of Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates would not have been different, since the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress based its decision on a public policy view recognizing absolute sovereign immunity, the only exception being when a defendant state waives immunity before a foreign state’s courts, and under Art. 5(2)(b) of the New York Convention, a state my refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award if doing so contravenes its public policy.
For these reasons, this decision should raise concerns for companies doing business with states holding assets in Hong Kong and mainland China. Should such companies ever wish to enforce a judgment against such assets, they will face the same challenges that FG Hemisphere Associates confronted.
SNR Denton reports the following background information: “Post 1997, Hong Kong has been in something of a quandary with regard to the issue of sovereign state immunity. On the one hand, the pre-1997 Common Law in Hong Kong acknowledged the doctrine of restrictive state immunity, that is, that a state could be sued when it has engaged in purely commercial transactions. On the other hand, the position in the People's Republic of China [PRC] has been consistent and unequivocal: Sovereign states enjoy absolute immunity from domestic courts of another sovereign state, the only exception being where the defendant state waives immunity before the forum state.”
On August 26, 2011, this dilemma came to the fore in the case Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates, which involves an attempt by US-based investment fund FG Hemisphere Associates to enforce arbitral awards against Hong Kong-based assets of the DRC. In June, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, in a controversial judgment overturning the Court of Appeal, came to the view that the DRC enjoyed an absolute right of immunity, notwithstanding what appeared to be an express waiver of immunity in the agreements signed by the DRC. The Court then referred the matter to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, which affirmed the Court’s conclusion: the DRC enjoys absolute immunity from the domestic courts of Hong Kong, the only exception being where the DRC waives immunity.
The challenges that this decision poses to investors applies not only when dealing with states holding assets in Hong Kong, but also when assets are being held anywhere in mainland China. Because the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress affirmed the CFA’s ruling, it would presumably similarly instruct courts located anywhere on mainland China to dismiss suits brought against sovereign states for the enforcement of arbitral awards when such states protest the jurisdiction of the courts of the PRC, regardless of what agreements the states have signed.
This is negative news for companies doing business with states (or state agencies). It likely means states could protect all of their funds and other assets in Hong Kong and mainland China and then sign whatever waivers as to sovereign immunity they wish, but when it comes to enforcing judgments awarded against them, simply not pay out refuse the jurisdiction of the courts of mainland China and Hong Kong at the hour of enforcement. The courts of China and Hong Kong will then dismiss the matters, given their policy of absolute sovereign immunity. Investors should be aware that, if a state does not pay out its judgment willingly, going to Hong Kong or mainland China for enforcement will bear little fruit.
The DRC is not a state party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which requires courts of contracting states to recognize and enforce arbitral awards made in other contracting states. Yet even if it were, it appears that the outcome of Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates would not have been different, since the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress based its decision on a public policy view recognizing absolute sovereign immunity, the only exception being when a defendant state waives immunity before a foreign state’s courts, and under Art. 5(2)(b) of the New York Convention, a state my refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award if doing so contravenes its public policy.
For these reasons, this decision should raise concerns for companies doing business with states holding assets in Hong Kong and mainland China. Should such companies ever wish to enforce a judgment against such assets, they will face the same challenges that FG Hemisphere Associates confronted.
Sunday, September 4, 2011
Turkey Announces Plan to Challenge Israel’s Gaza Blockade at the International Court of Justice
Turkey has recently announced its plan to challenge Israel’s blockade of Gaza at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). A forum that is potentially open to all states, the ICJ is the widest reaching court in the international arena. Yet will it have jurisdiction to hear Turkey’s case?
Turkey has not yet announced the claims that it will bring against Israel. Presumably, it will claim an illegal use of force on the raid of Turkey’s aid flotilla last year and for Israeli state responsibility for the deaths of nine foreign nationals (eight Turks and one American) that resulted from the raid. It is unlikely that Turkey could bring suit on a law of the sea theory, as it does not share territorial seas with southern Israel, where the naval blockade is imposed. Assuming Turkey challenged the legality of the flotilla raid and claimed Israeli state responsibility for the deaths, would the ICJ have jurisdiction?
Under the UN Charter, all UN members are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the ICJ and agree to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case to which they are parties (art. 93 UN Charter). The fact that Israel is a UN member does not however mean that the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear any claim brought against Israel by any other UN member state. Before the ICJ is able to adjudicate a particular contentious dispute, its jurisdiction must be established through the consent of all of the parties to the conflict. This consent can take any one of the following forms:
Therefore, the biggest challenge that Turkey will face in bringing suit against Israel is not proving that the naval blockade or use of force by Israel violated international law, but rather, establishing the Court’s jurisdiction to hear its claims against Israel, if Israel does not consent to the same.
For more on international law, the legality of the use of force and state responsibility, see Principles of International Law
.
Turkey has not yet announced the claims that it will bring against Israel. Presumably, it will claim an illegal use of force on the raid of Turkey’s aid flotilla last year and for Israeli state responsibility for the deaths of nine foreign nationals (eight Turks and one American) that resulted from the raid. It is unlikely that Turkey could bring suit on a law of the sea theory, as it does not share territorial seas with southern Israel, where the naval blockade is imposed. Assuming Turkey challenged the legality of the flotilla raid and claimed Israeli state responsibility for the deaths, would the ICJ have jurisdiction?
Under the UN Charter, all UN members are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the ICJ and agree to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case to which they are parties (art. 93 UN Charter). The fact that Israel is a UN member does not however mean that the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear any claim brought against Israel by any other UN member state. Before the ICJ is able to adjudicate a particular contentious dispute, its jurisdiction must be established through the consent of all of the parties to the conflict. This consent can take any one of the following forms:
- Ad hoc basis jurisdiction. The parties to a conflict accept ICJ jurisdiction for the particular case;
- Compromissory clause. The parties enter into a treaty providing for the settlement of disputes as to the application or interpretation of the treaty by the ICJ;
- ICJ compulsory jurisdiction. The parties give general agreement to accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction for a particular category of cases in relation to other nations that have done the same; or
- Carryover jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is granted from the Permanent Court of International Justice over certain disputes and this jurisdiction is carried over to the ICJ.
Therefore, the biggest challenge that Turkey will face in bringing suit against Israel is not proving that the naval blockade or use of force by Israel violated international law, but rather, establishing the Court’s jurisdiction to hear its claims against Israel, if Israel does not consent to the same.
For more on international law, the legality of the use of force and state responsibility, see Principles of International Law
.
Saturday, May 14, 2011
Responsabilidad extracontractual de los principales por daños a terceros en el Derecho norteamericano
Estos extractos vienen del capítulo 2 (Agencia) de mi libro, Introduction to American Business Organizations (Introducción a las organizaciones empresariales estadounidenses), que está siendo traducido al español y será publicado en otoño de este año 2011 por la Editorial Marcial Pons en Madrid. Para recibir noticias sobre el progreso del libro, me pueden contactar a jmb111[at]columbia[punto]edu.
1. Empleados frente a contratistas independientes
Los términos usados en un contrato para describir la relación entre un propietario y un prestador de servicios no son dispositivos para determinar si existe una relación de agencia. El elemento principal que vienen considerando los tribunales radica en el nivel de control del propietario sobre una compañía. Cuanto más control se ejerza sobre una compañía y sus prestadores de servicios, hay una mayor probabilidad de que exista una relación de agencia.
De este modo, el principal no puede liberarse de la responsabilidad de reclamaciones por daños de prestadores de servicios a terceros sólo por el hecho de que el prestador de servicio sea calificado como “contratista independiente” en el contrato. El propietario puede ser responsable frente a terceros por negligencia del prestador de servicios. En el caso Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin (Texas 1949), el demandante sufrió daños causados por un vehículo descontrolado en una estación de servicio gestionada por un operador prestador de servicios. Aunque el operador fue calificado como “contratista” en el contrato con el propietario, se consideró que existía una relación de agencia entre el propietario y el operador debido al control ejercido por el propietario sobre la gestión ordinaria del operador. En este caso, el propietario pagaba alguno de los gastos del operador, fijaba el horario de apertura de la estación de servicio y participaba en el proceso de toma de decisiones.
Esta regla se aplica incluso en las relaciones entre franquiciador y franquiciado. Según se definió en el caso Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc. (Va. 1975), la franquicia consiste en un sistema de distribución selectiva de bienes y servicios bajo una marca a través de establecimientos propiedad de empresarios independientes denominados “franquiciados”. Cuando el franquiciador ejerce suficiente control sobre las actividades del franquiciado, surge una relación de agencia. En el caso, Miller v. McDonald’s Corp. (Or. App. 1997), por ejemplo, el actor sufrió daños en su dentadura al comerse una hamburguesa por lo que demandó al franquiciador. La sentencia sumaria (summary judgment) inicial dictada en favor del franquiciador fue desestimada por el tribunal al entender que había evidencia suficiente para acreditar la existencia de una agencia ya que el franquiciador tenía el derecho a ejercer el control sobre las actividades del franquiciado. De este modo, el franquiciador fue considerado responsable de la negligencia del franquiciado que operaba el restaurante.
Por otro lado, en el caso Hoover v. Sun Oil Co. (Del. 1965) se entendió que no existía una relación de agencia. Aquí, el actor demandó al franquiciador y operador de una estación de servicio cuando sufrió daños por un incendio en la estación de servicio. El tribunal consideró que el franquiciador no ejercía suficiente control sobre el operador como para entender que existía una relación de agencia, por lo que le liberó de la responsabilidad derivada de la negligencia del franquiciado. Por contra, en este caso, el franquiciado fue tratado como un contratista independiente con control sobre sus propias decisiones y políticas, tales como, horarios de apertura del establecimiento y su limpieza e higiene. Aun cuando los productos Sun se vendía en la estación de servicio, eso no era suficiente para establecer una relación de agencia.
2. Responsabilidad extracontractual por daños causados por contratistas independientes
Generalmente, no existe relación de agencia respecto de actos causados por contratistas independientes. Sin embargo, existen ciertas excepciones, incluyendo las siguientes:
- Cuando el propietario de un terreno controla el modo en que el contratista independiente realiza sus trabajos de construcción.
- Cuando el contratista independiente no es competente.
- Cuando se desarrolla una actividad especialmente peligrosa.
El caso de Majestic Realty Associates, Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co. (N.J. 1959) claramente demuestra esta última excepción. En este caso, el demandado fue contratado por el Ayuntamiento de Paterson (City of Paterson) para demoler un edificio. En el curso de los trabajos, el demandado causó daños en el edificio del actor. El actor demandó al Ayuntamiento de Paterson bajo el argumento de la teoría de la agencia alegando que el Ayuntamiento era el principal del demandado. El Ayuntamiento se defendió alegando que el demandado era un contratista independiente y que por tanto el Ayuntamiento no debía ser responsable. El tribunal consideró que aunque el principal normalmente no es responsable de la negligencia del contratista independiente, en este caso el Ayuntamiento debía responder porque el contratista-demandado estaba desarrollando una actividad de por sí peligrosa: la demolición de un edificio de una calle concurrida.
3. Límite de las funciones (Scope of employment)
Para que el principal responda de los actos de su agente será necesario que el agente actúe dentro de los límites o marco de sus funciones o actividades. Anteriormente, esto significaba que el empleado o agente debía desarrollar sus actividades en aras al cumplimiento del propósito del principal. No obstante, una definición más flexible de este principio ha sido recientemente acuñada por los tribunales. De este modo, ahora se incluyen cualesquiera actos del agente en desarrollo de cualquier actividad que previsiblemente pueda realizar en aras al cumplimiento del propósito del principal, independientemente de si dicha actividad realmente sirve para dicho propósito.
Un tribunal federal en el caso Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States (2d Cir. 1968) adoptó una aproximación especialmente liberal a este cuestión. En este caso, un marinero que trabajaba para los Estados Unidos volvía a su barco borracho y provocó el hundimiento de la embarcación al abrir erróneamente las compuertas, causando daños en el dique propiedad del actor. Aunque el marinero, un agente de los Estados Unidos, no estaba en modo alguno contribuyendo al cumplimiento del propósito de su empleador, éste fue considerado responsable debido a que era previsible que un marinero que se emborrachara pudiera causar tal incidente. De este modo, el tribunal consideró que el marinero se encontraba dentro del marco de sus funciones o actividades laborales .
Si un actor quiere que el demandado sea declarado responsable de los actos de su empleado, el actor, a quien le corresponde la carga de la prueba, debe probar que el empleado actuaba dentro del marco de sus funciones laborales. En ocasiones esto puede llevar a resultados inesperados. Por ejemplo, en el caso Manning v. Grimsley (1st Cir. 1981), el actor demandó a un jugador de béisbol y a su empleador por los daños causados por el lanzamiento de una pelota de béisbol después de que el actor increpara con insultos al jugador. El tribunal concluyó que si se probaba que el demandado lanzó la pelota al actor como reacción a los insultos sobre sus capacidades como jugador, entonces el empleador podía ser declarado responsable. No obstante, si el lanzamiento de la pelota no fue provocado por los insultos, entonces el empleador no podría ser responsable de los actos del jugador, no provocados, ya que se trataría de actos imprevistos o fuera de su alcance. En el caso concreto, se demostró que el demandado lanzó la pelota como reacción a la provocación del actor. Por ejemplo, el demandado miraba a los increpadores y no sólo a las gradas.
4. Reclamaciones legales
Para poder demandar a un principal por responsabilidad extracontractual por daños causados por un tercero, el actor debe demostrar que existe una relación de agencia entre el demandado y el agente. A tal efecto, el actor debe probar que el demandado-principal consintió que el agente actuara por su cuenta y que el agente aceptó actuar por cuenta del principal.
En el caso Arguello v. Conoco, Inc. (5th Cir. 2000), unos grupos minoritarios demandaron por prácticas discriminatorias en los establecimientos del demandado en violación de la ley federal. El tribunal consideró que no existía relación de agencia entre el demandado y los establecimientos bajo la marca Conoco en la medida en que los acuerdos por los que se regulaba la venta de gasolina Conoco en los establecimientos claramente establecían que dichos establecimientos eran independientes sin sujeción a relación de agencia. Sin embargo, en el caso de los establecimientos propios de Conoco los empleados actuaban como agentes del demandado, por lo que en dichos casos sí existía relación de agencia y, por ende, respecto a éstos, el tribunal falló en favor de los actores.
1. Empleados frente a contratistas independientes
Los términos usados en un contrato para describir la relación entre un propietario y un prestador de servicios no son dispositivos para determinar si existe una relación de agencia. El elemento principal que vienen considerando los tribunales radica en el nivel de control del propietario sobre una compañía. Cuanto más control se ejerza sobre una compañía y sus prestadores de servicios, hay una mayor probabilidad de que exista una relación de agencia.
De este modo, el principal no puede liberarse de la responsabilidad de reclamaciones por daños de prestadores de servicios a terceros sólo por el hecho de que el prestador de servicio sea calificado como “contratista independiente” en el contrato. El propietario puede ser responsable frente a terceros por negligencia del prestador de servicios. En el caso Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin (Texas 1949), el demandante sufrió daños causados por un vehículo descontrolado en una estación de servicio gestionada por un operador prestador de servicios. Aunque el operador fue calificado como “contratista” en el contrato con el propietario, se consideró que existía una relación de agencia entre el propietario y el operador debido al control ejercido por el propietario sobre la gestión ordinaria del operador. En este caso, el propietario pagaba alguno de los gastos del operador, fijaba el horario de apertura de la estación de servicio y participaba en el proceso de toma de decisiones.
Esta regla se aplica incluso en las relaciones entre franquiciador y franquiciado. Según se definió en el caso Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc. (Va. 1975), la franquicia consiste en un sistema de distribución selectiva de bienes y servicios bajo una marca a través de establecimientos propiedad de empresarios independientes denominados “franquiciados”. Cuando el franquiciador ejerce suficiente control sobre las actividades del franquiciado, surge una relación de agencia. En el caso, Miller v. McDonald’s Corp. (Or. App. 1997), por ejemplo, el actor sufrió daños en su dentadura al comerse una hamburguesa por lo que demandó al franquiciador. La sentencia sumaria (summary judgment) inicial dictada en favor del franquiciador fue desestimada por el tribunal al entender que había evidencia suficiente para acreditar la existencia de una agencia ya que el franquiciador tenía el derecho a ejercer el control sobre las actividades del franquiciado. De este modo, el franquiciador fue considerado responsable de la negligencia del franquiciado que operaba el restaurante.
Por otro lado, en el caso Hoover v. Sun Oil Co. (Del. 1965) se entendió que no existía una relación de agencia. Aquí, el actor demandó al franquiciador y operador de una estación de servicio cuando sufrió daños por un incendio en la estación de servicio. El tribunal consideró que el franquiciador no ejercía suficiente control sobre el operador como para entender que existía una relación de agencia, por lo que le liberó de la responsabilidad derivada de la negligencia del franquiciado. Por contra, en este caso, el franquiciado fue tratado como un contratista independiente con control sobre sus propias decisiones y políticas, tales como, horarios de apertura del establecimiento y su limpieza e higiene. Aun cuando los productos Sun se vendía en la estación de servicio, eso no era suficiente para establecer una relación de agencia.
2. Responsabilidad extracontractual por daños causados por contratistas independientes
Generalmente, no existe relación de agencia respecto de actos causados por contratistas independientes. Sin embargo, existen ciertas excepciones, incluyendo las siguientes:
- Cuando el propietario de un terreno controla el modo en que el contratista independiente realiza sus trabajos de construcción.
- Cuando el contratista independiente no es competente.
- Cuando se desarrolla una actividad especialmente peligrosa.
El caso de Majestic Realty Associates, Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co. (N.J. 1959) claramente demuestra esta última excepción. En este caso, el demandado fue contratado por el Ayuntamiento de Paterson (City of Paterson) para demoler un edificio. En el curso de los trabajos, el demandado causó daños en el edificio del actor. El actor demandó al Ayuntamiento de Paterson bajo el argumento de la teoría de la agencia alegando que el Ayuntamiento era el principal del demandado. El Ayuntamiento se defendió alegando que el demandado era un contratista independiente y que por tanto el Ayuntamiento no debía ser responsable. El tribunal consideró que aunque el principal normalmente no es responsable de la negligencia del contratista independiente, en este caso el Ayuntamiento debía responder porque el contratista-demandado estaba desarrollando una actividad de por sí peligrosa: la demolición de un edificio de una calle concurrida.
3. Límite de las funciones (Scope of employment)
Para que el principal responda de los actos de su agente será necesario que el agente actúe dentro de los límites o marco de sus funciones o actividades. Anteriormente, esto significaba que el empleado o agente debía desarrollar sus actividades en aras al cumplimiento del propósito del principal. No obstante, una definición más flexible de este principio ha sido recientemente acuñada por los tribunales. De este modo, ahora se incluyen cualesquiera actos del agente en desarrollo de cualquier actividad que previsiblemente pueda realizar en aras al cumplimiento del propósito del principal, independientemente de si dicha actividad realmente sirve para dicho propósito.
Un tribunal federal en el caso Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States (2d Cir. 1968) adoptó una aproximación especialmente liberal a este cuestión. En este caso, un marinero que trabajaba para los Estados Unidos volvía a su barco borracho y provocó el hundimiento de la embarcación al abrir erróneamente las compuertas, causando daños en el dique propiedad del actor. Aunque el marinero, un agente de los Estados Unidos, no estaba en modo alguno contribuyendo al cumplimiento del propósito de su empleador, éste fue considerado responsable debido a que era previsible que un marinero que se emborrachara pudiera causar tal incidente. De este modo, el tribunal consideró que el marinero se encontraba dentro del marco de sus funciones o actividades laborales .
Si un actor quiere que el demandado sea declarado responsable de los actos de su empleado, el actor, a quien le corresponde la carga de la prueba, debe probar que el empleado actuaba dentro del marco de sus funciones laborales. En ocasiones esto puede llevar a resultados inesperados. Por ejemplo, en el caso Manning v. Grimsley (1st Cir. 1981), el actor demandó a un jugador de béisbol y a su empleador por los daños causados por el lanzamiento de una pelota de béisbol después de que el actor increpara con insultos al jugador. El tribunal concluyó que si se probaba que el demandado lanzó la pelota al actor como reacción a los insultos sobre sus capacidades como jugador, entonces el empleador podía ser declarado responsable. No obstante, si el lanzamiento de la pelota no fue provocado por los insultos, entonces el empleador no podría ser responsable de los actos del jugador, no provocados, ya que se trataría de actos imprevistos o fuera de su alcance. En el caso concreto, se demostró que el demandado lanzó la pelota como reacción a la provocación del actor. Por ejemplo, el demandado miraba a los increpadores y no sólo a las gradas.
Para poder demandar a un principal por responsabilidad extracontractual por daños causados por un tercero, el actor debe demostrar que existe una relación de agencia entre el demandado y el agente. A tal efecto, el actor debe probar que el demandado-principal consintió que el agente actuara por su cuenta y que el agente aceptó actuar por cuenta del principal.
En el caso Arguello v. Conoco, Inc. (5th Cir. 2000), unos grupos minoritarios demandaron por prácticas discriminatorias en los establecimientos del demandado en violación de la ley federal. El tribunal consideró que no existía relación de agencia entre el demandado y los establecimientos bajo la marca Conoco en la medida en que los acuerdos por los que se regulaba la venta de gasolina Conoco en los establecimientos claramente establecían que dichos establecimientos eran independientes sin sujeción a relación de agencia. Sin embargo, en el caso de los establecimientos propios de Conoco los empleados actuaban como agentes del demandado, por lo que en dichos casos sí existía relación de agencia y, por ende, respecto a éstos, el tribunal falló en favor de los actores.
Tuesday, May 3, 2011
Natural Law Theory and Its Implications on Universal Human Rights
Until quite modern times, the law was infused with the idea that some principles could not only receive, but also merit, approval or disapproval, and that certain responses could be more just, ordinate, or appropriate than others. This concept is rooted as far back as the ancient Greek philosophers. Aristotle stated that “the aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he ought.” The concept was infused in the philosophical treatises of writers as distinct as Augustine in the West and Avicenna in the East, all who referred back to Aristotle in formulating systemic theological treatises that sought to unveil systems of absolute truth. Like those after them, they discovered through human reason a law universal to all cultures and written on the heart of man. Among the values inherent in this universal law are beneficence, justice, good faith and veracity, mercy and magnanimity. Among the precepts of the universal law are commandments to love one’s neighbor as oneself and injunctions against murder, theft, and bearing of false witness.
These precepts are available to man not only through God’s special revelations given to prophets throughout history, but also through man’s capacity to think and reason. Where men of reason and virtue are permitted to think freely and without restraint or coercion, they inevitably recognize these laws. They also recognize that man is born free, with a natural right to life and liberty.
A. The History of England as an Illustration
The history of England is in this respect illustrative. Men of conscience struggled over a millennium to secure man’s basic inherent rights against kings that historically refused to acknowledge any law higher than themselves. The people’s first victory was the Magna Carta of 1215, establishing citizens’ rights, followed by the Petition of Right by 1628, a defense of the supremacy of the common law over the king, the Glorious Revolution, the English Bill of Rights, and ultimately the abolition of slavery in England. One finds natural law thinking reiterated throughout the great thinkers who shaped and justified these events, from de Bracton to Coke, from Milton to Locke, and even Wilberforce, all who vindicated the idea that the law was above any man, including the king, and that man had certain inherent rights that no ruler could infringe.
B. That the Principles Set Forth in the English Revolution Are Universal to Mankind
1. The United States and France
One cannot understand the American Revolution in general, and the United States Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and Bill of Rights in particular, without understanding the English Revolution. The American Revolution was in many ways the embodiment of the principles set forth in the Glorious Revolution of England. One further cannot understand the French Revolution and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen without understanding the revolutions in England and the United States that preceded it. While each revolution had its own particular context and placed a different degree of weight on the place of faith, tradition, and reason in defining new constitutions and institutions, each one developed a commitment to the fundamental and natural rights of man, such as his rights to liberty, property, expression, association, and assembly.
2. The International Community at Large
a) Instruments of the UN Prove that Rights are Universal
It would be mistaken to state that the rights established by these revolutions are limited to Western nations. Rather, these rights were instituted and embodied in the virtually universally adopted Charter of the United Nations and its related instruments. On June 26, 1945, the international community convened in San Francisco and signed the CUN, the Preamble of which lists as one of the UN’s purposes the affirmation of fundamental human rights and human dignity. The CUN has been adhered to by virtually all states; the few remaining non-member states have acquiesced in the principles established in the CUN.
The fundamental human rights and human dignity laid out in the CUN are further outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 as an elaboration of the human rights provisions of the UN Charter. The UDHR has been nearly universally adopted, passing at the time of its promulgation with 48 votes in favor, zero against, and 8 abstentions. Some sources consider the UDHR to be a nonbinding resolution that set forth a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations” (Preamble UDHR); others view it as an elaboration of the human rights provisions of the UN Charter, and thus claim that it is binding through the Charter.
Regardless of whether the UDHR is binding, a series of more recent international treaties convert the provisions of the UDHR into binding treaty provisions. Among these are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). The majority of states in the international community are parties to the ICCPR, which currently has 167 states party, as well as to the ICESCR, which currently has 160 states party. States parties to the ICCPR undertake to protect the wide range of civil and political rights, including a right to life (art. 6 ICCPR), prohibitions on torture (art. 7 ICCPR) and slavery (art. 8 ICCPR), prohibitions on arbitrary arrest or detention (art. 9.1 ICCPR), a right to trial within a reasonable time of arrest or detainment (art. 9.3 ICCPR) and to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 18 ICCPR), as well as freedom of expression (art. 19 ICCPR). Many of these rights reiterate those vindicated in the English, American, and French revolutions, thus demonstrating that they are not limited to Western nations; rather, as nations across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East have recognized and committed to these rights, they have been proven to be universally applicable.
Although countries in the Middle East have signed on to these Covenants, many scholars maintain that the rights embodied therein are western inventions that are incompatible with Arab or Muslim society. Such scholars point to human rights track records in the Middle East as evidence of this: in most countries in the Middle East, with a few exceptions such as Lebanon, political parties not belonging to the governing elite are banned, freedom of expression is heavily restricted, arbitrary arrests and detentions are the norm, and human rights are categorically violated. Scholars thus argue that the adhesion of Middle Eastern states to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a mere publicity stunt that has no real bearing as to whether the rights contained therein are appropriate or even compatible with Middle Eastern society.
b) Arab Spring Proves that Universal Rights Belong to the Arab Peoples As Well
Yet events today in the Middle East prove otherwise. In the Arab Spring that we see spreading across the Middle East, from Morocco to Bahrain, from Yemen to Syria, the peoples of the Middle East have proven that they too wish to enjoy the same basic human rights that have been in place in the West for centuries. They have demonstrated their aspiration to see the implementation of rights and liberties that heretofore were limited to meaningless treaties and other obligations that were signed but ignored by governing authorities. They too have shown that the right to life, liberty, expression, freedom of belief, association, a free press, and a right to choose one’s own government are not limited to the Christian West, but rather, are universal to mankind. They have shown through their blood and sacrifices that man is better and more noble as a martyr than as an imprisoned animal lacking dignity. They have demonstrated the nobility of the human spirit, what it seeks and strives for, and how it yearns with an unquenchable thirst for the freedom that is naturally granted to every human being by his Creator.
These precepts are available to man not only through God’s special revelations given to prophets throughout history, but also through man’s capacity to think and reason. Where men of reason and virtue are permitted to think freely and without restraint or coercion, they inevitably recognize these laws. They also recognize that man is born free, with a natural right to life and liberty.
A. The History of England as an Illustration
The history of England is in this respect illustrative. Men of conscience struggled over a millennium to secure man’s basic inherent rights against kings that historically refused to acknowledge any law higher than themselves. The people’s first victory was the Magna Carta of 1215, establishing citizens’ rights, followed by the Petition of Right by 1628, a defense of the supremacy of the common law over the king, the Glorious Revolution, the English Bill of Rights, and ultimately the abolition of slavery in England. One finds natural law thinking reiterated throughout the great thinkers who shaped and justified these events, from de Bracton to Coke, from Milton to Locke, and even Wilberforce, all who vindicated the idea that the law was above any man, including the king, and that man had certain inherent rights that no ruler could infringe.
B. That the Principles Set Forth in the English Revolution Are Universal to Mankind
1. The United States and France
One cannot understand the American Revolution in general, and the United States Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and Bill of Rights in particular, without understanding the English Revolution. The American Revolution was in many ways the embodiment of the principles set forth in the Glorious Revolution of England. One further cannot understand the French Revolution and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen without understanding the revolutions in England and the United States that preceded it. While each revolution had its own particular context and placed a different degree of weight on the place of faith, tradition, and reason in defining new constitutions and institutions, each one developed a commitment to the fundamental and natural rights of man, such as his rights to liberty, property, expression, association, and assembly.
2. The International Community at Large
a) Instruments of the UN Prove that Rights are Universal
It would be mistaken to state that the rights established by these revolutions are limited to Western nations. Rather, these rights were instituted and embodied in the virtually universally adopted Charter of the United Nations and its related instruments. On June 26, 1945, the international community convened in San Francisco and signed the CUN, the Preamble of which lists as one of the UN’s purposes the affirmation of fundamental human rights and human dignity. The CUN has been adhered to by virtually all states; the few remaining non-member states have acquiesced in the principles established in the CUN.
The fundamental human rights and human dignity laid out in the CUN are further outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 as an elaboration of the human rights provisions of the UN Charter. The UDHR has been nearly universally adopted, passing at the time of its promulgation with 48 votes in favor, zero against, and 8 abstentions. Some sources consider the UDHR to be a nonbinding resolution that set forth a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations” (Preamble UDHR); others view it as an elaboration of the human rights provisions of the UN Charter, and thus claim that it is binding through the Charter.
Regardless of whether the UDHR is binding, a series of more recent international treaties convert the provisions of the UDHR into binding treaty provisions. Among these are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). The majority of states in the international community are parties to the ICCPR, which currently has 167 states party, as well as to the ICESCR, which currently has 160 states party. States parties to the ICCPR undertake to protect the wide range of civil and political rights, including a right to life (art. 6 ICCPR), prohibitions on torture (art. 7 ICCPR) and slavery (art. 8 ICCPR), prohibitions on arbitrary arrest or detention (art. 9.1 ICCPR), a right to trial within a reasonable time of arrest or detainment (art. 9.3 ICCPR) and to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 18 ICCPR), as well as freedom of expression (art. 19 ICCPR). Many of these rights reiterate those vindicated in the English, American, and French revolutions, thus demonstrating that they are not limited to Western nations; rather, as nations across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East have recognized and committed to these rights, they have been proven to be universally applicable.
Although countries in the Middle East have signed on to these Covenants, many scholars maintain that the rights embodied therein are western inventions that are incompatible with Arab or Muslim society. Such scholars point to human rights track records in the Middle East as evidence of this: in most countries in the Middle East, with a few exceptions such as Lebanon, political parties not belonging to the governing elite are banned, freedom of expression is heavily restricted, arbitrary arrests and detentions are the norm, and human rights are categorically violated. Scholars thus argue that the adhesion of Middle Eastern states to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a mere publicity stunt that has no real bearing as to whether the rights contained therein are appropriate or even compatible with Middle Eastern society.
b) Arab Spring Proves that Universal Rights Belong to the Arab Peoples As Well Yet events today in the Middle East prove otherwise. In the Arab Spring that we see spreading across the Middle East, from Morocco to Bahrain, from Yemen to Syria, the peoples of the Middle East have proven that they too wish to enjoy the same basic human rights that have been in place in the West for centuries. They have demonstrated their aspiration to see the implementation of rights and liberties that heretofore were limited to meaningless treaties and other obligations that were signed but ignored by governing authorities. They too have shown that the right to life, liberty, expression, freedom of belief, association, a free press, and a right to choose one’s own government are not limited to the Christian West, but rather, are universal to mankind. They have shown through their blood and sacrifices that man is better and more noble as a martyr than as an imprisoned animal lacking dignity. They have demonstrated the nobility of the human spirit, what it seeks and strives for, and how it yearns with an unquenchable thirst for the freedom that is naturally granted to every human being by his Creator.
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